SUPPLEMENTALJURISDICTION AND SECTION 1367:
THE CASE FOR A SYMPATHETIC TEXTUALISM
JAMES E. PFANDER
INTRODUCTION

Something appears to be going badly wrong with the interpretation of 28 U.S.C. § 1367 ("section 1367"). In the nine short years
since Congress enacted it as one of several "noncontroversial" provisions of the Judicial Improvements Act of 1990,' the statute that defines the supplementaljurisdicuon of the district courts of the United
t Professor of Law, University of Illinois College of Law. Thanks to Steve Burbank,
Ellen Deason, Rick Marcus, Tom Mengler, John Oakley, Tom Rowe, David Shapiro,
Joan Steinman, and Jay Tidmarsh for helpful comments on earlier drafts. In suggesting the need for a sympathetic reading, I follow the lead of the drafters of section 1367
although my reading of the text departs from theirs in a number of particulars.
' See Section 310 of the Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650,
104 Stat. 5089 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (1994)) [hereinafter section 1367]. For
the text of section § 1367, see infra note 43. The Judicial Improvements Act of 1990
was assembled by selecting "noncontroversial" changes from among those recommended by the Federal Courts Study Center. AbnerJ. Mikva &James E. Pfander, On
the Meaningof CongressionalSilence: UsingFederal Common Law to Fill the Gap in Congress's
ResidualStatute of Limitations,107 YALE L.J. 393, 398 (1997) (noting the method House
Subcommittee Chairman Kastenmeier used in selecting features of the Report of the
Study Committee for incorporation into an implementing bill). On the origins of section 1367, see Thomas M. Mengler et al., Congress Accepts Supreme Court's Invitation to
Codif SupplementalJurisdiction,74JTDICATURF 213, 213-14 (1991), andJohn B. Oakley,
Recent Statutory Changes in the Law of FederalJurisdictionand Venue: TheJudicialImprovements Acts of 1988 and 1990, 24 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 735, 757-63 (1991). See generally
Denis F. McLaughlin, The Federal SupplementalJurisdictionStatute: A Constitutionaland
Statutory Analysis, 24 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 849, 859-89 (1992).
2 Before section 1367 codified them under the common label of "supplemental
jurisdiction," the doctrines of "pendent" and "ancillary" jurisdiction had developed
along two separate lines in the decisional law of the Supreme Court. See Owen Equip.
& Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 370 (1978) (describing pendent and ancillary
jurisdiction as "two species of the same generic problem"). For nice accounts of the
separate but related development of the doctrines, see Richard D. Freer, A Principled
Statutory Approach to SupplementalJurisdiction,1987 DunE L.J. 34, and Richard Matasar, A
Pendent and AncillaryJurisdictionPrimer. The Scope and Limits of Supplemental Jurisdiction,
17 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 103 (1983). As both works suggest in their titles, the doctrines
of pendent and ancillary jurisdiction often marched under the supplemental banner
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States has attracted an enormous body of scholarly commentary,
much of it critical of Congress's handiwork.3 With this body of critical
commentary have come the predictable calls for reform and revision.
Although defenders of the statute initially argued that the federal
courts could work around the problems through flexible interpretation,5 the prospects for such creative solutions have diminished in rebefore they were codified in such terms in section 1367.
3 Professor Richard Freer was among the first and sharpest critics of the statute.
See Richard D. Freer, Compounding Confusion and HamperingDiversity: Life after Finley
and the Supplemental Jurisdiction Statute; 40 EMORY L.J. 445, 471 (1991) [hereinafter
Freer, Life After Finley] (attacking the supplemental jurisdiction statute for "maiming
efficient packaging of diversity cases... precluding supplemental jurisdiction in alienage cases and confusing areas that had been relatively clear"). Professor Freer's critique drew a defense from the drafters-Tom Rowe, Steve Burbank, and Tom
Mengler-and the exchange grew increasingly heated. See Thomas D. Rowe, Jr. et al.,
Compounding Confusion or Creating Confusion About SupplementalJurisdiction? A Reply to
Professor Freer, 40 EMORY L.J. 943, 943-44 (1991) [hereinafter Rowe et al., A Reply]
("Professor Richard Freer purports to separate the wheat from the chaff and then proceeds to torch the farm, exuberantly and extensively telling the federal courts how to
get it all wrong."); Thomas C. Arthur & Richard D. Freer, Graspingat Burnt Straws: The
Disasterof the SupplementalJurisdictionStatute, 40 EMORY L.J. 963, 963 (1991) [hereinafter Arthur & Freer, The Disaster] ("If Professor Freer in fact torched the entire farm, it
is because there was so much dry straw lying around after the three drafters finished
tilting with the strawmen they created in their response to Professor Freer's article.");
Thomas D. Rowe, Jr. et al, A Coda on SupplementalJurisdiction,40 EMORY L.J. 993, 1006
(1991) [hereinafter Rowe et al., A Coda] ("[We trust that cooler heads than those of
Professors Arthur and Freer will join us in resisting their call to gut or scrap a needed
statute that is already proving its value."); Thomas C. Arthur & Richard D. Freer, Close
Enough for Government Work. What Happens When Congress Doesn't Do Its Job, 40 EMORY
L.J. 1007, 1007 (1991) [hereinafter Arthur & Freer, Close Enough] ("[If only someone
had spent as much time writing the statute as the trio [of drafters] has spent writing
about the statute."). This more pointed rhetoric may have persuaded other scholars to
steer clear of the controversy, at least initially. Some of the contributors to an Emory
Symposium on the subject one year later appear to have worried about becoming entangled in a similar exchange. See Erwin Chemerinsky, RationalizingJurisdiction, 41
EMORY L.J. 3, 4 (1992) (describing both the drafting Trio and the critical Duo as right
in certain respects and studiously declining to offer any opinion on "each point in
the... debate"); Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Debate Over § 1367: Defining the Power
to Define FederalJudicialPower, 41 EMORYL.J. 13, 13 (1992) (noting the "intensity" of the
debate but describing it as a mistake to "joinissue").
4 Professors Freer and Arthur initially called for statutory revision as part of their
criticism of section 1367. SeeArthur & Freer, The Disaster,supra note 3, at 985 (describing a congressional fix as the only sensible course). Since then, calls for revision have
occurred with great regularity. See Christopher M. Fairman, Abdication to Academia: The
Case of the Supplementaljurisdiction Statute, 19 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 157, 190 (1994)
(calling for Congress to undertake "immediate minor revisions, major deliberative actions and a revised disclaimer"); infra note 8 (listing proposed revisions). For an account of the current reform efforts of the American Law Institute, see infra notes 69-74
and the accompanying text.
5 See, e.g., Rowe et al., A Reply, supranote 3, at 960 n.90 (arguing that the reference
in the legislative history might help to overcome the possibility that the statute had al-
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cent years as the federal courts have adopted a more text-centered
approach to statutory interpretation. .6 This rigorous textualism now
threatens to reshape the rules of federal jurisdiction quite dramatically and to produce results that appear very much at odds with the
relatively modest expectations of the enacting Congress.7
As a consequence, a growing consensus of academic opinion now
holds that Congress should revise the law of supplemental jurisdiction. One recent symposium featured articles from a variety of respected scholars, many of whom agree that section 1367 requires at
least a tune-up if not a more substantial legislative overhaul. 8 This
tered the rule of Zahn v. InternationalPaperCo.); id,at 960 (suggesting that sympathetic
interpretation of the statute might solve many of the problems identified by the critics); cf. Arthur & Freer, The Disaster,supra note 3, at 983 (suggesting that the call for
"sympathetic" interpretation will not overcome statutory ambiguity). For more on the
problem of Zahn, see infranotes 48-54.
6 Recent years have witnessed a resurgence of interest in the theory of
statutory
interpretation. A generation ago, courts made routine use of the legislative history of
federal statutes, taking for granted the idea (now associated with the Legal Process
school) that statutes respond purposively to some mischief that Congress has identified. Such purposive interpretation has faced two primary challenges: one from the
public choice theorists and a second from those who emphasize the centrality of the
text in the interpretive process. For an overview, see William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip
P. Frickey, An Historicaland Critical Introduction to The Legal Process, in HENRY M.
HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROcEss Ii (William N. Eskridge,Jr. & Philip
P. Frickey eds., 1994). On the rise of textualism generally, and its influence on both
academics and federal judges, see William N. Eskridge, Jr., Textualism, The Unknown
Ideal?, 96 MIcH. L. REv. 1509, 1511-14 (1998) (book review) (identifingJustice Antonin Scalia as the Court's leading textualist in the course of reviewing his essay on interpretation).
Justice Scalia placed his interpretive stamp on the law of supplementaljurisdiction
in his opinion for the Court in Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545, 552 (1989), emphasizing the absence of any textual basis for the assertion of pendent-party jurisdiction.
Although Congress adopted section 1367 in response, the subsequent interpretation of
the statute owes much to the literal textualism thatJustice Scalia insisted upon in Finley. See infra text accompanying notes 36-42 (describing the Finley opinion authored by
Justice Scalia).
Most of this disputation has centered on the application of the new statute to actions within the diversityjurisdiction of the federal district courts. See Stromberg Metal
Works, Inc. v. Press Mech., Inc., 77 F.3d 928, 931 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that section
1367 also changes amount-in-controversy rules in ordinary multi-party diversity litigation); In re Abbott Labs., Inc., 51 F.3d 524, 529 (5th Cir. 1995) (holding that section
1367 relaxes strict rules governing amount-in-controversy determinations in diverseparty class action litigation). For a more detailed account of Abbott Laboratoriesand
Stromberg see infra text accompanying notes 50-59. See generally Freer, Life After Finley,
supra note 3, at 475-76 (objecting to the statute's restrictive approach to diversityjurisdiction).
8 All four of the lead authors in the symposium support statutory change. See
Richard D. Freer, Toward a PrincipledStatutory Approach to SupplementalJurisdictionin Diversity of Citizenship Cases, 74 IND. L.J. 5, 17 (1998) (arguing for statutory revision to
broaden supplemental jurisdiction in diversity proceedings);John B. Oakley, Integrat-
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movement for a statutory fix coincides with last year's action of the
American Law Institute ("ALI"). Acting at its meeting in May 1998,
the ALI approved Tentative Draft No. 2 of a fully revised version of
section 1367.9 The ALI Draft presents a new conceptual approach to
the issues of supplemental jurisdiction and traces the implications of
its new approach in illuminating and sometimes exhausting detail.
Approval of the draft lends the ALI's prestige as an agency of law reform to the movement for a statutory revision.
Although amendments to the statute may indeed prove necessary,
their adoption should await the judicial consideration of an alternative approach to the interpretation of section 1367. The alternative
presented in this Article, which I refer to as "sympathetic textualism,"
represents an attempt to fuse two competing approaches to the interpretation ofjurisdictional law, those of the legislative historians and of
the rigorous textualists. In the wake of section 136 7 's adoption, opinion about the workability of the statute divided into two camps. On

ing SupplementalJurisdictionand DiversityJurisdiction: A ProgressReport on the Work of the
American Law Institute, 74 IND. LJ. 25, 45-52 (1998) (setting forth views of the reporter
to the ALIJudicial Code Revision Project on its proposals for statutory change); Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Section 1367 and All That: Recodifying FederalSupplementalJurisdiction,
74 IND. L.J. 53, 70-73 (1998) (proposing a revision of section 1367(b) that would modify the statute's operation in diversity); Joan Steinman, Crosscurrents:SupplementalJurisdiction, Removal and the ALI Revision Project, 74 IND. LJ. 75, 114-22 (1998) (suggesting
an amendment to address the problem of supplementaljurisdiction in removed cases).
A good many other participants in the Indiana symposium express support for
amendments as well. See, e.g., Howard P. Fink, SupplementaIJurisdiction-TakeIt to the
Limit, 74 IND. L.J. 161, 161 (1998) (supporting an abolition of all limits on supplemental jurisdiction in diversity matters); Graham C. Lilly, Making Sense of Nonsense: Reforming SupplementalJurisdiction,74 IND.L.J. 181, 189-94 (1998) (proposing an abolition of
complete diversity, a relaxation of the restrictions on supplemental jurisdiction, and
the use of amount-in-controversy rules to limit docket pressure). On the other hand,
at least some observers support a move away from more detailed rules and back to a
regime ofjudicial discretion. See Edward H. Cooper, An Alternative and Discretionay §
1367, 74 IND. L.J. 153, 153-54 (1998) (urging the adoption of an amendment that
would restore a measure of judicial discretion in the interpretation of supplemental
jurisdiction); David L. Shapiro, SupplementalJurisdiction:A Confession, An Avoidance, and
a Proposal,74 IND.L.J. 211, 218-20 (1998) (same). Like these commentators, I doubt
the efficacy of greater statutory detail and support a restoration of the lawmaking partnership between Congress and the courts.
9 The American Law Institute published Tentative Draft No. 1 of its Federal
Judicial Code Revision Project in April 1997. Although Draft No. 1 was returned for further drafting, the Institute approved the supplemental jurisdiction proposals contained in Tentative Draft No. 2 at its meeting in May 1998. See Civil ProcedureSupplementalJurisdiction: ALI Advocates ProposedAmendment to SupplementalJurisdiction
Statute, 66 U.S.L.W. 2719 ( May 26, 1998) (reporting the ALI's unanimous approval).
For the details of the ALI proposal, see AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, FEDERALJUDICIAL
CODE REVISION PRoJECr, TENTATIVE DRAFT No. 2 (1998) [hereinafter ALI DRAFT].

1999]

SUPPLEMENTALJURISDICTION

one side were the drafters of the statute and its defenders, who argued
that the federal courts could resolve textual problems with the statute
through reliance upon legislative history. In contrast to those who invoked legislative history, the statute's critics insisted upon the interpretive primacy of the text and argued that the statute might well unsettle jurisdictional law. The debate between the historians and the
textualists over the meaning of the supplemental jurisdiction statute
corresponded to a similar debate in legisprudential circles over the
role of legislative history in statutory interpretation. Indeed, it was the
Court's leading textualistJustice Antonin Scalia, who emphasized the
centrality of the text in Finley v. United States, ° the jurisdictional decision that led to the adoption of section 1367.
In calling for a sympathetic textualism, I propose a reading of section 1367 that attempts to bridge the gap between these two schools of
interpretive thought. My sympathetic approach takes the expressed
purpose of Congress and the history of pendent and ancillary jurisdiction as valid (if not controlling) considerations and uncovers new interpretive possibilities in the language of the statute. I thus follow to
some extent the lead of the more historically minded drafters of the
statute, who first called for a "sympathetic" consideration of legislative
purpose in the interpretation of the statute." The textualism I advance here may also appeal to the more rigorous textual critics of the
statute. For even the most committed textualist will often invoke canons of statutory construction to aid the interpretive process, as Justice
Scalia's own textualist decision in Finley reveals. Finley invoked the
canon that Congress, in revising and consolidating the laws, does not
intend to change their effect unless such intention is "'clearly expressed.'' 12 Such a rule establishes a regime of continuity with the
past, very much in keeping with the insights in Professor David Shapiro's thoughtful
defense of the use of the canons in the interpretive
13
process. The canons can thus assist the textualist, as Professor Shapiro notes, in a "sincere and sympathetic effort" to uncover the meaning of a statute by reminding us all that statutes rarely produce unan10490 U.S. 545, 552 (1989).
" See supra note 5 (noting the drafters' preference for a sympathetic interpretation
for the statute).
12 Finey, 490 U.S. at 554 (quoting Anderson v. Pacific Coast S.S. Co., 225 U.S.
187,

199 (1912)).
13 See David L. Shapiro, Continuity and Change in Statutory
Interpretation,67 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 921, 925 (1992) (arguing that "the dominant theme running through most interpretive [canons] that actually influence outcomes is that close questions of construction should be resolved in favor of continuity and against change").
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4
nounced but revolutionary changes in the law.'
My sympathetic textualism produces a reading of section 1367 that
fits well both with the legislative history's expressed desire to preserve
the established rules of complete diversity and with the canonical emphasis on continuity with the past. In particular, my approach reads
section 1367(a) as having incorporated the joinder and aggregation
rules of complete diversity into its requirement that the district courts
first obtain "original jurisdiction" of the claims in a civil action. On
this account, the grant of supplemental jurisdiction in section 1367(a)
does not supplant diversity's joinder and aggregation rules but comes
into play in diversity proceedings only after those requirements have
been satisfied. Similarly, the restrictions in section 1367(b) operate to
prevent the erosion of the complete diversity requirement that might
otherwise result from an expansive application of what was once
termed the doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction. So read, the statute
leaves in place differences that had marked the pre-codification operation of the doctrine of supplemental jurisdiction in federalquestion and diversity matters, and occasions none of the unexpected
changes in law that the current interpretive approach ascribes to the
statute. In thus proposing a reading of section 1367 that corresponds
to Congress's apparent design, this Article's "sympathetic textualism"
may obviate the need for further legislative tinkering and restore the
courts' role in the further elaboration of supplemental jurisdictional
law.
The Article develops its case for a sympathetic interpretation of
section 1367 in three parts. Part I reviews the origins of the supplemental jurisdiction statute and sketches its academic and judicial reception. I show that, beneath the surface of an ongoing debate over
its proper interpretation, a broad consensus has developed concerning the meaning of the statutory text. Part II of the Article presents a
more sympathetic alternative to the standard account of the text.
Building on the important jurisdictional distinction between federalquestion cases and diverse-party controversies, and the way that distinction informed the evolution of the judge-made doctrines of pendent and ancillary jurisdiction that became supplemental jurisdiction,
the Article proposes and defends an interpretation of section 1367(a)
that leaves the federal courts free to apply the tenets of diversity jurisdiction as they continued to evolve before and after the statute's adoption. Part III suggests that the Article's contrast between sympathetic

14

Id. at 926.
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and unsympathetic textualism may shed some light on current debates
over the proper role of the federal courts in the interpretation ofjurisdictional statutes and on the need for further reform of the kind
now contemplated in the work of the ALI.

I. THE STANDARD AccouNT OF SECTION 1367

Although fierce academic battles have marked much of the field
of supplemental jurisdiction, 5 some uncontested terrain remains.
Perhaps most importantly, one finds in the literature a virtually universal and largely unspoken consensus about the best way to understand the interplay between the first two subsections of section 1367.16
The Article describes this reading as the standard account of section
'- See supra note 3 for its collection of citations giving an overview of the battleground. One author assessed the casualties by ascribing to his mother the comment
that a "lot of fur" was flying. Rowe, supranote 8, at 53.
'6 One finds the assumption that the broad grant of supplemental jurisdiction in
section 1367(a) operates with the same impact in both federal-question and diversity
matters in virtually every published writing on the subject. See ALI DRAFt, supra note
9, at 58, 76 (showing that the reference to Rule 20 occasions a decisive narrowing of an
otherwise broad grant of supplemental jurisdiction by indicating that section 1367(a)
would have had a "revolutionary" effect on difrsity litigation but for the restrictions in
subsection (b), and that the "plain meaning" of section 1367 trumps the aggregation
rules in diversity only where the plaintiffs sue a single defendant); Arthur & Freer, The
Disaster,supranote 3, at 982 (indicating that the grant ofjurisdiction in subsection (a)
.over all claims satisfying the constitutional test for supplemental jurisdiction" may
overrule Strawbridge); Freer, Life After Finley, supra note 3, at 485 (noting that section
1367(a) extends supplemental jurisdiction to the constitutional limit while section
1367(b) creates exceptions; recognizing the omission of the exception for Rule 23;
and so assuming full pendent-party jurisdiction was conferred in subsection (a));
Wendy Collins Purdue, The New SupplementalJurisdictionStatute-FlawedBut Fxabl4 41
EMoRYLJ. 69, 77 (1992) (indicating that section 1367(b) fails to answer the question
ofjurisdiction presented by class actionjoinder under Rule 23 or by nondiverse plaintiff joinder under Rule 20 and thus revealing an assumption that subsection (a)
authorizes supplemental jurisdiction of such matters in diversity); Rowe et al., A Reply,
supra note 3, at 960-61 nn.90-91 (acknowledging that section 1367 might overrule Zahn
and Strawbrnidgeand thus interpreting section 1367(a) as a broad grant of pendentjurisdiction applicable to diversity matters); Joan Steinman, Section 1367-Another Party
HeardFrom, 41 EMoRYLJ. 85, 95-96 (1992) (indicating that, in diversity matters and in
the absence of an exception in subsection (b), the grant of supplemental jurisdiction
in subsection (a) requires not an inquiry into consistency with section 1332 but an inquiry into transactional relationship under Article III); see alsoLilly, supra note 8, at 184
(describing the broad grant of supplemental jurisdiction in section 1367(a) as operating without regard to the jurisdictional basis on which plaintiff grounds the action);
Stephen C. Yeazell, Teaching SupplementalJurisdiction,74 IND. LJ. 241, 246 (1998) (describing the broad grant of supplemental jurisdiction in section 1367(a) as partially
retracted as to diversity matters in subsection (b)).
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1367. To understand the standard account and to see how it influences modem interpretations of the statute requires some background on the nature of supplemental jurisdiction. After providing
the necessary background, this Part sets out the standard account of
section 1367, notes its influence with courts and commentators, and
shows how it informs the revision project of the ALL.
A. The Originsof SupplementalJurisdiction
Section 1367 represents an attempt by Congress to codify the doctrines of pendent and ancillary jurisdiction under the common rubric
of supplemental jurisdiction. 7 The Supreme Court had developed
the two doctrines in a series of decisions running well back into the
nineteenth century 8 without much in the way of explicit guidance
from Congress 9 and without identifying an entirely satisfying conceptual or statutory basis for them.2 0 As a consequence, the judicial doc17

See McLaughlin, supra note 1, at 860 (expressing approval of Congress's "benefi-

cial" decision to abandon the old labels of pendent and ancillary jurisdiction in favor
of the generic term "supplementaljurisdiction").
18 Ancillaryjurisdiction developed first, as the Supreme Court agreed to permit the
assertion of jurisdiction over claims brought by intervenors who sought to perfect
claims to property other litigants had previously brought within the custody of a federal court. See, e.g., Freeman v. Howe, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 450, 460 (1860) (upholding
jurisdiction over "ancillary and dependent [claims] ... without reference to the citizenship or residence of the parties"). The Court extended ancillary jurisdiction in a
series of subsequent cases. See Moore v. New York Cotton Exch., 270 U.S. 593 (1926)
(upholding ancillary jurisdiction over defendant's compulsory counterclaim under
state law). See generally Freer, supra note 2, at 50-53 (arguing that the development of
ancillaryjurisdiction served the twin goals of allowing efficient packaging of cases and
avoiding duplicative litigation).
Pendent jurisdiction developed along a separate track, as plaintiffs in federalquestion cases came to join state-law claims as part of their "cause of action" against the
defendant. See Hum v. Oursler, 289 U.S. 238, 247 (1933) (describing federal copyright
claim and state unfair competition claims as two grounds in support of the "same cause
of action"); Siler v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 213 U.S. 175, 192-93 (1909) (holding
that jurisdiction over federal due process claim encompassed related state-law claim
challenging rates as having exceeded state authority); McLaughlin, supra note 1, at
870-71 (describing how pendent-claim jurisdiction developed separately from ancillary
jurisdiction).
'9 SeeJAcKH. FRIEDENTHAL ETAL., CIVIL PROCEDUE § 2.12-.14 (1985) (describing
pendent and ancillary jurisdiction as judicially created); CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, THE
LAw OF FEDERAL COURTS 103-06 (5th ed. 1994) (describing the judicial origin of pendent and ancillary jurisdiction doctrines); cf. Freer, supra note 2, at 55 (noting the
.oxymoron [ic]" tradition of regarding supplemental jurisdiction as a "common law"
doctrine of "subject matter jurisdiction" and arguing that such doctrines should be
seen as interpretations of the statutory grant ofjurisdiction over a civil action).
20 On the lack of an adequate statutory foundation, see Freer, supranote 2, at 55.
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trine of supplemental jurisdiction showed some of the messy signs of
case-by-case elaboration, with curious stops and starts along the way.
Although the Court adopted a rather expansive approach to pendent
jurisdiction in the federal-question context of United Mine Workers v.
21
Gibbs its more cautious approach in Owen Equipment & Erection Co. v.
Krogersoughtto prevent ancillary jurisdiction from eroding the rule of
complete diversity. 2
The contrast between Gibbs and Kroger provides a useful introduction to the conceptual underpinnings of supplemental jurisdiction
and to the debate that continues to swirl around the statute. In Gibbs,
the plaintiff brought suit in federal court alleging both a secondaryboycott claim under federal labor law and a state-law claim for interference with advantageous business relations.23 In the current parlance of supplemental jurisdiction, we would refer to the federalquestion claim as "jurisdictionally sufficient," 'jurisdiction conferring," or, in the words of the ALI Draft, "freestanding," to convey the
notion that the claim supports an assertion of original jurisdiction on
its own and without regard to any other claim in the action. 24 By way
of contrast, the state-law claim lacked this jurisdictional sufficiency or
freestanding quality in light of the absence of complete diversity between the plaintiff and defendants. Nonetheless, the Gibbs Court
agreed that the district courts may assert what was then known as pendent-claim jurisdiction over the state-law claim. The Court reasoned
that the state-law claim arose from the "same common nucleus of operative fact" as the freestanding claim and the two claims thus formed

2'383 U.S. 715, 721-29 (1966) (holding that pendentjurisdiction exists over state-

law claims which constitute part of the same constitutional "case" as one or more federal-question claims).
22 437 U.S. 365, 373-77 (1978) (citing the complete-diversity rule in refusing to
permit plaintiff tojoin a claim against a nondiverse, impleaded third-party defendant).
2' See Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 718-20 (describing the plaintiff's suit and the circumstances

giving rise to it).
24 Courts and commentators have struggled somewhat in their search for the best
shorthand expression to capture the concept of a claim that falls within the district
court's original jurisdiction and might provide ajurisdictional anchor for the assertion
of supplementaljurisdiction. See Kroger, 437 U.S. at 372 n.11 (distinguishing between

"federal" and "nonfederal" claims); Palmer v. HospitalAuth., 22 F.3d 1559, 1566 (11th
Cir. 1994) (distinguishing between "anchor[]" claims and "supplemental" claims); cf.
McLaughlin, supra note 1, at 869 (distinguishing the "jurisdiction ...supporting" federal-question claim in Gibbs from the "jurisdictionally insufficient" state-law claim). I
agree with the ALI drafters that the term "freestanding" captures the idea ofjurisdictional sufficiency as well as any. See ALI DRAFT, supra note 9, at 35-43 (defining and
illustrating the difference between "freestanding" and "supplemental" claims).
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a single constitutional case for purposes of Article 111 .. The Court
also noted that a decision to permit the district courts to hear the
claims would serve the interests of litigant convenience and judicial
economy and help to secure the just and speedy resolution of disputes. 26
Although similar concerns with litigant fairness and judicial economy underlay the development of ancillary jurisdiction, the Court's
decision in Kroger revealed a competing concern for the completediversity rule.27 In Kroger, the plaintiff brought suit against a single diverse defendant, asserting a state-law claim for personal injuries that
satisfied the amount-in-controversy requirement. 28 (The ALI Draft
would treat such a claim as "freestanding."2) The defendant impleaded a third-party defendant in accordance with Rule 14 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, arguing that the new defendant
might bear responsibility for some portion of any award to the plaintiff.s0 The plaintiff responded by asserting claims against this new defendant, as Rule 14 further contemplates.3 ' Both supplemental
claims-that by the defendant and that by the plaintiff-satisfied the
"common nucleus" test of Gibbs and a decision to permit jurisdiction
The Gibbs Court acknowledged that the two claims might not satisfy the test of
Hum v. Oursler,270 U.S. 593 (1926), as two grounds in support of the same "cause of
action" but dismissed the Hum test as "unnecessarily grudging." Gibbs,383 U.S. at 725.
Instead, the Court held that the district courts may assert pendent-claim jurisdiction
over a state-law claim that arises from the same "common nucleus of operative fact" as
the federal-question claims. Id This "common nucleus" test has been quite widely regarded as allowing the exercise of jurisdiction over claims that satisfy many of the
transactional tests set forth in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and as extending
the scope ofjurisdiction to the boundaries of Article III of the Constitution. Cf.infra
note 45 (describing the contention that Article III permits district courts to hear set-off
claims that do not satisfy the common-nucleus test).
2 See id. at 726 (noting that the justification for pendent jurisdiction "lies in considerations ofjudicial economy, convenience and fairness to litigants").
See Kroger, 437 U.S. at 374 (noting that under a sufficiently expansive theory of
supplemental jurisdiction, "a plaintiff could defeat the statutory requirement of complete diversity by the simple expedient of suing only those defendants who were of diverse citizenship and waiting for them to implead nondiverse defendants").
28 Id. at 367.
See ALI DRAFr, supra note 9, at 36-37 (noting that its definition of a "freestanding" claim encompasses claims within the original jurisdiction of the district courts on
the basis of both the federal-question and diversityjurisdictional grants).
30 See FED. R. CV. P. 14(a) (providing for the defendant to implead a third-party
defendant on a claim that such defendant "is or may be liable" for some portion of the
plaintiff's claim against the original defendant).
31See id. (providing that the plaintiff may assert any claim against the third-party
defendant arising out of the same transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter
of the plaintiff's claim against the original defendant).
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over the entire "case" would have served the interests of convenience
and economy. But the KrogerCourt refused to go so far, emphasizing
the availability of state court as a convenient, alternative forum. While
the Court expressed a willingness to permit the assertion of jurisdiction over the defendant's ancillary claims against a new party under
Rule 14,32 it refused to extend such jurisdiction to the claims of the
plaintiff against the new party.3 3

The Court worried that plaintiffs

might omit nondiverse defendants from their initial complaint, await
their predictable impleader under Rule 14, and then amend their
complaint to assert the previously omitted claims, a strategy that might
undermine the complete-diversity requirement.s
Although the restrictive approach of Kroger attracted some negative reviews,35 it was the Court's decision in Finley v. United State36 that
gave rise to the enactment of section 1367. The Finley plaintiff
brought suit against the United States for tort damages (a "freestanding" claim under federal law) and joined state-law claims against nondiverse defendants who allegedly bore responsibility for the airplane
crash that led to the litigation. Despite the obvious transactional relationship among the claims, the Finley Court refused to permit the assertion of what was then termed pendent-party jurisdiction over the
plaintiff's state-law claims against the nondiverse defendantsss The
32

See Kroger, 437 U.S. at 375 n.18 (citing with apparent approval decisions that

authorize the assertion of ancillary jurisdiction over claims by defendants against impleaded third-party defendants).
See id at 375-76 (emphasizing that the proposed assertion of ancillary jurisdiction over a claim by a plaintiff who had voluntarily chosen the federal diversity docket
differed significantly from that over a claim by a defendant "haled into court against
his will").
See id. at 377 ("To allow the requirement of complete diversity to be circumvented as it was in this case would simply flout the congressional command.").
See Freer, Life After Finley, supra note 3, at 459-61 (arguing that Kroger was
wrongly decided); McLaughlin, supra note 1, at 880 (arguing that Krogerfailed to define the "permissible limits of supplementaljurisdiction").
490 U.S. 545 (1989). All of the scholarly andjudicial commentary on the statute
recognizes the decisive role that Finley played in leading Congress to adopt section
1367. See, e.g., CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., 13 FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE:
JURISDICTION AND RELATED MATTERS 2d, § 3523, at 65 (Supp. 1999) [hereinafter
FEDERAL PRACTICE] (ascribing the origins of section 1367 to the decision in Finley);
McLaughlin, supra note 1, at 889 (same).
37 See Finley, 490 U.S. at 546 (noting that plaintiff sued the United
States under the
Federal Tort Claims Act ("FrCA") and then "moved to amend the federal complaint to
include claims against the original state-court defendants, as to which no independent
basis for federal jurisdiction existed").
See id. at 553, 556 (stating that "[t]he statute here defines jurisdiction in a manner that does not reach defendants other than the United States" and declining to
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Finley Court acknowledged the strength of the arguments of litigant
convenience and judicial economy, arguments made stronger by the
plaintiff's inability as in Krogerto join claims against all the defendants
in a single state court proceeding.39 But the Court nonetheless refused to approve jurisdiction over the pendent parties, citing the absence of any written statutory authorization for such jurisdiction.4 0 Although the Court distinguished Gibbs and the situation of pendentclaim jurisdiction,4 ' its emphasis on the absence of a statute appeared
to threaten many established forms of supplemental jurisdiction over
additional parties.42

permit the assertion of pendent-partyjurisdiction).
39See id. at 555 (acknowledging that its decision would sacrifice the efficiency and
convenience of litigating multiple claims in a single action); cf. id. at 555-56 (refusing
to adopt dicta in Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1, 18 (1976), which had hinted that the
exclusive jurisdiction conferred in the FTCA over claims against the United States provided a strong argument for the exercise of pendent-partyjurisdiction).
'0 See id. at 552 (emphasizing that the jurisdictional grant in question spoke of
"civil actions on claims ... against the United States" and did not, by its terms, authorize claims against anyone else).
41 See id. at 549-51 (emphasizing the fundamental analytical difference between the
pendent-claim jurisdiction in Gibbs and the joinder of parties not named in any claim
that is independently cognizable); id. at 556 (describing Gibbs as "a departure from
prior practice" that the Court had no intent to "limit or impair").
42 See Thomas M. Mengler, The Demise of Pendent and AndllaiyJurisdiction,
1990 BYU
L. REV. 247, 258-60 (arguing that the rationale of Finley threatened ancillary jurisdiction as well as the pendent-claim jurisdiction recognized in Gibbs); cf. McLaughlin, supra note 1, at 887-89 (noting that Finley threatened Gibbs by characterizing the decision
as a departure from prior practice and summarizing post-Finleyjudicial decisions).
Apart from the threat, Finley also issued an invitation to Congress. By emphasizing
the need forjurisdiction conferred by "written law," Finey, 490 U.S. at 547 (quoting Ex
parteBollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 93 (1807)), the Court obviously contemplated the
possibility that Congress might supply the law in question. The Court also supplied a
set of "interpretive rules" to enable Congress to "know the effect of the language it
adopts." Finley, 490 U.S. at 556. The rules appeared earlier in the opinion, in the
course of its rejection of the argument that existing statutory provisions conferred jurisdiction in terms flexible enough to support an exercise of pendent jurisdiction.
This argument for flexible interpretation rested upon the recodification of the jurisdictional statutes in 1948 against the backdrop of decisions that had expanded the
scope ofjurisdiction over civil actions to take account of the growth in the litigation
unit reflected in the Federal Rules. But the Finley Court rejected this flexible approach, noting that the real growth in pendentjurisdiction came in Gibbs-a decision
that came down well after the 1948 recodification had occurred. See id. at 555 (noting
that the liberalization of pendent-party jurisdiction effected by Gibbs occurred "nearly
20 years later" than the recodification the plaintiff relied on).
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B. The Text and Meaning ofSection 1367
Congress responded with section 1367.4 As commonly interpreted, the statute confers a broad grant of supplemental jurisdiction
in subsection (a), allowing the district courts to hear nonfederal
claims that bear an appropriately close relationship to the claims over
which the court has originaljurisdiction 4 The statute follows Gibbs in
defining the scope of supplemental jurisdiction and expressly permits
the assertion of jurisdiction over pendent parties, thus supplying the

Section 1367 reads as follows:
(a) Except as provided in subsections (b) and (c) or as expressly provided
otherwise by Federal statute, in any civil action of which the district courts
have original jurisdiction, the district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to claims in the action within such
original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy under
Article III of the United States Constitution. Such supplemental jurisdiction
shall include claims that involve thejoinder or intervention of additional parties.
(b) In any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction
founded solely on section 1332 of this title, the district courts shall not have
supplemental jurisdiction under subsection (a) over claims by plaintiffs
against persons made parties under Rule 14, 19, 20, or 24 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, or over claims by persons proposed to be joined as plaintiffs under Rule 19 of such rules, or seeking to intervene as plaintiffs under
Rule 24 of such rules, when exercising supplemental jurisdiction over such
claims would be inconsistent with the jurisdictional requirements of section
1332.
(c) The district courts may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over
a claim under subsection (a) if-(l) the claim raises a novel or complex issue
of State law, (2) the claim substantially predominates over the claim or claims
over which the district court has original jurisdiction, (3) the district court has
dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction, or (4) in exceptional circumstances, there are other compelling reasons for declining jurisdiction.
(d) The period of limitations for any claim asserted under subsection (a), and
for any other claim in the same action that is voluntarily dismissed at the same
time as or after the dismissal of the claim under subsection (a), shall be tolled
while the claim is pending and for a period of 30 days after it is dismissed unless State law provides for a longer tolling period.
(e) As used in this section, the term "State" includes the District of Columbia,
the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and any territory or possession of the
United States.
4 See, e.g., Lilly, supra note 8, at 184 (describing the statute as opening in subsection (a) with a "broad conferral of supplemental jurisdiction" and following that grant
with limits in subsection (b) on the scope of such jurisdiction in diversity matters);
Yeazell, supranote 16, at 246 (explaining that the statute "establishes a broad jurisdictional grant in subsection (a) and then retracts much of that grant in subsection (b),
whose restrictions apply to diversity-only cases").
'3
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statutory underpinning that the Finley Court identified as missing.
Subsection (b) seeks to preserve certain of the limitations that had developed on the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction in the diversity
cases. In particular, subsection (b) codifies the rule of Krogerby foreclosing the assertion of jurisdiction over claims by plaintiffs against
persons made parties under Rule 14.16 Subsection (c) codifies the discretionary factors that the Gibbs Court had directed district courts to
47
consider in determining whether to assert supplemental jurisdiction.
Although section 1367 has generated an enormous body of scholarly literature and a raft of conflicting lower court decisions, the
proper reading of its text has become a matter of quite widespread
consensus. Both the statute's detractors and defenders agree that
subsection (a) provides a broad grant of supplemental jurisdiction
that applies to both federal-question and diversity proceedings and extends to the limits of Article III. Both camps agree that the exceptions
to this grant of supplemental jurisdiction appear in subsection (b)
and operate primarily in diversity litigation. But despite widespread
agreement about the interplay between subsections (a) and (b)-what
I call the standard account of section 1367-scholars and courts disagree about the legal effect of the enacted words. Critics charge that
the plain meaning of the statute makes or threatens a series of sweeping changes in the law of supplemental jurisdiction; defenders cite
legislative history that clearly shows a desire on the part of Congress
simply to overrule Finley and codify most of the pre-Finley status quo.
For useful discussions of the relationship between the constitutional limits of
supplemental jurisdiction and the "common nucleus" test of Gibbs, see William A.
Fletcher, 'Common Nucleus of Operative Fact" and Defensive Set-Off. Beyond the Gibbs Test,
74 IND. L.J. 171 (1998), which argues in favor of the existence of constitutional power
to adjudicate an unrelated defensive set-off, despite the absence of any common nucleus among the freestanding and supplemental claims. See also McLaughlin, supra
note 1, at 890-95 (explaining the relationship between the constitutional case or controversy requirement and the supplementaljurisdiction statute).
16 On the statute's preservation of the rule of Kroger,see McLaughlin,
supra note 1,
at 936-40. Critics of the statute admit that it preserves the rule of Kroger, and focus
their criticism on the decision to do so. See, e.g., Arthur & Freer, The Disaster,supra
note 3, at 975-78 (arguing that Krogerwaswrongly decided and that the statute not only
preserved but extended its wrongheaded features); Freer, supra note 8, at 13-15

(same).
47As the Supreme Court explained, subsection (c) "codifie[s] [the] principles" of
economy, convenience, fairness, and comity that inform the discretionary regime of
Gibbs. City of Chicago v. International College of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156, 165 (1997).

For doubts about the effectiveness of the codification, see ALI DRAFT, supranote 9, at
78-95 (arguing that the statute may have invited lower federal courts to refrain from
hearing claims, such as "freestanding" and ancillary claims, to which the regime of discretion should not apply).
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One can best understand this familiar debate over the proper
roles of text and legislative history in statutory interpretation by considering the impact of section 1367 on the amount-in-controversy rule
of Zahn v. InternationalPaper Co.48 The Zahn Court held that, even

where the claims of the named plaintiffs meet the threshold amount,
diversity jurisdiction does not extend to those unnamed members of a
plaintiff class whose individual claims fail to meet the amount-incontroversy requirement. The standard account of the statute holds
that the plain meaning of section 1367 alters the outcome in Zahn.
After jurisdiction attaches to the jurisdictionally sufficient claim of a
single, named class representative (a "freestanding" claim), section
1367(a) provides supplemental jurisdiction over the jurisdictionally
insufficient but related claims of the additional class members.
Moreover, since 1367(b) does not specify an exception for claims
joined under Rule 23 (class actions), the broad grant in subsection (a)
controls the outcome.
Although the argument that the text of section 1367 overrules
Zahn first appeared in Professor Freer's critique of the statute,' the
Fifth Circuit has given it the force of law. Its decision in In re Abbott
Laboratories,Inc.5' features the standard textual argument in the heart
of its opinion: "Section 1367(a) grants district courts supplemental
jurisdiction over related claims generally, and § 1367(b) carves excep" 2
tions. Significantly, class actions are not among the exceptions.
Having made the textual argument, the Abbott Laboratoriescourt acknowledged that the House had included a statement in the legislative
history to the effect that the section was not intended to overrule
Zahn.53 But the court refused to look behind the text, concluding that
section 1367 authorized the assertion ofjurisdiction rejected in Zahn.i
48414 U.S.

291 (1973).

' See id. at 301 (holding that the district courts, sitting in diversity, may not assert
jurisdiction over the claims of unnamed class members who fail to meet the amount-in-

controversy requirement).
o See Freer, Life After Finley, supra note 3, at 485-86 (criticizing the statute as a
threat to Zahn and implying that the disclaimer of this interpretation in the legislative
history is an insufficient precaution); ef.Freer, supra note 8, at 18 (opining that "[a] II

observers agree that the supplemental-jurisdiction statute, on its face, overrules Zahn7).
5'51 F.3d 524 (5th Cir. 1995).
52Id at 527.
53 See id at 528 (citing H.R. REP. No. 101-734, at 29 (1990), repinted in
1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6860, 6875 n.17, which, the court states, "cites Zahn as a pre-Finley case
untouched by the Act").
54See i&at 528-29 (stating that "[w]e are persuaded that under § 1367 a district
court can exercise supplemental jurisdiction over members of a class, although they
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The Fifth Circuit expressly refused to enter into a discussion of the
"wisdom of Zahn"; that was "not our affair."55
With the growing emphasis on textualism, and the accompanying
distrust of legislative history, the widespread acceptance of the standard account of section 1367 appears likely to threaten a number of
established jurisdictional rules. In Stromberg Metal Works, Inc. v. Press
Mechanical,Inc.,s the Seventh Circuit followed the lead of the Fifth in
holding that section 1367 overrules the jurisdictional rule of Clark v.
Paul Gray, Inc.57 The Clark court held that diversity jurisdiction attaches only to the claims of plaintiffs, joined under Rule 20, whose individual claims meet the amount-in-controversy threshold.s The
Stromberg court concluded that section 1367 altered that result by conferring a supplemental jurisdiction on the district courts broad
enough to encompass the related, but jurisdictionally insufficient,
claims of additional plaintiffs. 59
Much the same textualism informs the Fourth Circuit's decision
that section 1367 overturns the legal-certainty rule of St. Paul Mercury
Indemnity Co. v. Red Cab Co.60 The St. Paul court held that diversity jurisdiction attaches at the threshold to claims that the plaintiff asserts
in the complaint, unless it appears to a legal certainty that the claims
will not satisfy the jurisdictional amount.6 1 In Shanaghanv. Cahil,62 the
Fourth Circuit read section 1367 as supplanting the St. Paul rule. In
particular, the Fourth Circuit concluded that the summary disposition
of one of three aggregated claims-a disposition that brought the
amount claimed below the jurisdictional amount-brought into play
the discretionary power of the district court to decline jurisdiction
over the remaining claims.6 The Fourth Circuit acknowledged that
did not meet the amount-in-controversy requirement.
" I& at 529.

.

'6 77 F.3d 928 (7th Cir. 1996).
57 See Stromberg Metal Works, Inc. v. Press Mech., Inc., 77 F.3d
928, 930-31 (7th
Cir. 1996) (concluding that section 1367 overrules Clark v. PaulGray, Inc., 306 U.S. 583
(1939)).
See Clark, 306 U.S. at 589 (holding that a claim asserted in a diversity case must
separately meet the amount-in-controversy requirement).

'9See StrombergMetal Works, Inc., 77 F.3d at 931.
303 U.S. 283 (1938).
61 See id. at 288.
62 58 F.3d 106 (4th Cir. 1995).

0 See id. at 112 (holding that "[i]fsome event subsequent to the complaint reduces
the amount in controversy, such as the dismissal of one count... , the court must then
decide in its discretion whether to retain jurisdiction over the remainder of the case").
See also Stevenson v. Severs, 158 F.3d 1332, 1334 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (holding that when
dismissal of claims reduces the amount in controversy below the statutory minimum,
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this discretionary regime departed from the old rule, which had
treated the amounts claimed in the complaint as controlling and ignored actual awards in determining whether the plaintiff satisfied the
jurisdictional amount requirement. Nonetheless, the court concluded
that section 1367 had effected a change in the law by making the discretionary regime of subsection (c) applicable to such aggregated
claims. 64
Scholars have identified a good many other settled jurisdictional
rules that the statute, read in keeping with the standard account,
might alter. Without elaborating all of the potentially affected areas,
it seems plain that section 1367 might alter the complete-diversity rule
of Strawbridge v. Curtis and could modify in important respects the
manner in which supplemental jurisdiction operates in removed
cases. 6 The Court itself has already interpreted section 1367 as conferringjurisdiction on the district courts to hear pendent claims in the
nature of cross-system petitions for appellate review of state administrative proceedings, a decision driven by the kind of textualism that
informs the standard account.67 As a result of these and other possible
changes, scholars who initially defended the statute against charges of
ambiguity have now reluctantly concluded that some re-drafting may
be necessary.
"the district court has discretion to entertain the remaining claim if it so chooses," pursuant to section 1367(c)'s discretionary dismissal provision). But see Wolde-Meskel v.
Vocational Instruction Project Community Serv., Inc., 166 F.3d 59, 65 (2d Cir. 1999)
(holding that "[w]hen state law claims are aggregated, regardless of the amounts at
issue, all of them together are 'original,' and none of the constituent claims are 'supplemental,'" making section 1367(c)'s discretionary-dismissal regime inapplicable).
6See
Shanaghan, 58 F.3d at 111 (holding that "the strict St. Paulrule is inconsistent
with the statutory framework of § 1367 and so must be modified to fit the contemporary congressional view of federaljurisdiction").
7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806). The complete-diversity rule of Strawbridgev. Curtiss holds that citizens of the same state may not appear on opposing sides of a diversity
proceeding. See id. The failure of section 1367(b) to include thejoinder of additional
plaintiffs under Rule 20 could support a textual argument that the statute overrules
Strawbridge See, e.g., Rowe et al., A Reply, supra note 3, at 961 n.91 ("We can only hope
that the federal courts will plug that potentially gaping hole in the complete diversity
requirement. ... ").
For a summary of the questions that scholars have raised about the application
of section 1367 to actions removed to federal court, see infra notes 151-56 and accompanying text.
67 See City of Chicago v. International College of Surgeons, 522
U.S. 156, 168-69
(1997) (holding that a pendent claim seeking appellate review of a local administrative
decision may fall within section 1367's grant of supplementaljurisdiction).
"See, e.g., Rowe, supra note 8, at 53-54 (suggesting that the time has come to shift
the focus of the debate regarding section 1367 from the problems with the current
statute to the best way to redraft it). But cf id. at 57-58 (worrying cogently that highly
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C. The Proposalof the American Law Institute
The movement for reform received a boost from the decision of
the American Law Institute to approve a new and more detailed draft
of section 1367 (the "ALI Draft") for possible enactment into law by
Congress. According to the project's Reporter, John B. Oakley, the
ALI Draft of section 1367 proposes to reconceptualize the interplay
between original and supplemental jurisdiction.6 Based upon the insight that the rules now governing thejoinder of claims and parties in
diversity jurisdiction are themselves rules of supplemental jurisdiction,7 the ALI Draft proposes a more general approach that distinguishes between "freestanding" and "supplemental" claims.7' Then,
with admirable rigor and attention to detail, the ALI Draft specifies a
set of rules to govern the exercise of supplementaljurisdiction. In the
course of the work, the ALI Draft revises and extends the criticisms
that others have made of the current version of section 1367.
Although they defy easy summary, the 165 pages that comprise the
ALI Draft and its accompanying commentary, memoranda, and appendices reveal much the same commitment to a rigorous textualism
that has characterized the Abbott Laboratoriesand Stromberg decisions.7
literal textualism may undermine the creation of a sound, practical relationship between the federal courts and Congress).
69 As the ALI Draft acknowledges, reconceptualization comes at a price.
In a candid and, to my mind, accurate description of the likely reaction of many judges and
practicing lawyers, the draft admits that readers who try to take in the complexity of
the statute may feel some "indigestion." ALI DRAFT, supranote 9, at xvii.
70 See id. (concluding that the rule of complete diversity is not in tension with the
concept of supplemental jurisdiction but is a rule of supplemental jurisdiction that restricts its operation in diversity cases).
7 According to the Draft, "freestanding" claims are those that come "within
the
original jurisdiction of the district courts without reliance upon supplemental jurisdiction." Id. "Supplemental" claims are not freestanding but they bear a relationship to
them such that, together, they form a single case or controversy within the meaning of
Gibbs. See id- at 35-39 (setting forth the text of a proposed replacement for section
1367(a) which distinguishes in a definitional section between freestanding and supplemental claims). By breaking down the jurisdictional analysis into what it calls claimspecific terms and by treating both federal-question claims and diversity claims as potentially "freestanding," the ALI Draft makes clear that it intends to extendjurisdiction
on a conceptually similar basis to supplemental claims in both federal-question and
diverse-party proceedings. See id. at 31-37 (laying out the basis for a reconceptualization of supplementaljurisdiction).
7 To see that the ALI Draft proceeds upon the same interpretative assumption as
the Abbott Laboratoriesand Stromberg courts, consider its discussion of proposed section

1367(c), which performs the same function as current section 1367(b) in reining in
the grant of supplemental jurisdiction in an earlier section. See id. at 58-59. In the
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The draft itself acknowledges as much, in the course of questioning
the legitimacy of "the sort of pragmatic discretion rather than express
legislative command that long colored the whole realm of diversity jurisdiction."7 Viewing the days of such pragmatic discretion as numbered, the ALI Draft notes that "[t]he legitimacy of this pragmatic discretion was questioned in [Finley], and the enactment the following
year of present § 1367 substituted a new regime of close attention to
the literal text and plain meaning of the statutory conferral of supplemental jurisdiction."74 The ALI Draft carries this new regime of
close attention to literal text to its logical conclusion, specifying in
some detail the way in which its rules of supplemental jurisdiction play
out in a variety of different contexts. One can quibble with certain of
the choices in the ALI Draft, and an enacting Congress might well
tinker with its provisions. Ultimately, though, a decision to adopt
something like the ALI Draft would move the law of federal jurisdiction decisively away from a reliance upon pragmatic discretion and
decisively into the realm of textual literalism.
Perhaps the combination of Finley and section 1367 leaves us with
no alternative to an increasingly detailed jurisdictional code. But before we endorse the textual literalism of the ALI Draft, this Article
proposes that we explore a more sympathetic approach to the interpretation of current section 1367. Such an approach may make it
possible to retain the statutory underpinning of supplemental jurisdiction and to preserve some portion of the pragmatic discretion that
had informed the evolution of the rules of diversity before the codification. It certainly avoids the textualist overkill of such cases as Abbott
Laboratoriesand Stromberg.
IL. TOWARD A MORE SYMPATHETIC READING OF SECTION 1367

Carefully read, section 1367 reveals no clearly expressed intention
to alter the laws of diversity jurisdiction. Indeed, quite the contrary.
Section 1367(a) appears to assume that the existing rules of complete
diversity will continue to apply and that the grant of supplementaljucourse of its analysis, the ALI Draft describes current section 1367(a) as "imperfectly
articulated in claim-specific terms"-terms that would have "revolutionary" consequences but for the restrictions in section 1367(b). Id. at 58. Here, then, we see the
same interpretation of section 1367(a) that characterizes the standard account of the
statute-a broad grant of supplemental jurisdiction in diversity-party cases followed by
a restriction on the grant. See supra note 16.
73 AL

74 1.

DRAFr, supra note 9, at 65.
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risdiction will come into play only after the plaintiff has submitted
claims that properly invoke such original jurisdiction. Consider again
the language of the first sentence of subsection (a):
Except as provided in subsections (b) and (c) . .. in any civil action of
which the district courts have original jurisdiction, the district courts shall
have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to
claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part
of the same case or controversy.75
Literally read, this language provides for the assertion of supplemental jurisdiction only as to claims that bear a transactional relationship to the "claims" asserted in a "civil action" of which the district
courts have "original jurisdiction." The statute thus appears to distinguish between joinder and aggregation issues that inform the existence of original jurisdiction and those that operate as part of the district courts' supplemental jurisdiction.
In this textual distinction lies the key to the sympathetic reading
of section 1367. Before Finley, the Court had developed doctrines of
pendent and ancillary jurisdiction that operated quite differently in
federal-question and diversity proceedings. In federal-question cases,
original jurisdiction attached to any well-pleaded complaint that asserted a substantial federal claim; pendent jurisdiction came quickly
into play to govern the plaintiff's initial joinder of additional claims
along the lines the Court developed for pendent claims in Gibbs (but
rejected for pendent parties in Finley). In the pre-Finley world of diversity, by contrast, the rules of original jurisdiction (rather than of
supplemental jurisdiction) governed a broad range of initial joinder
and aggregation questions. 76 Only after original jurisdiction attached
in accordance with these fairly elaborate rules of complete diversity
did the doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction come into play. One can
thus read section 1367(a) as having incorporated the rules of complete diversity into the statute's requirement that the district courts
first obtain original jurisdiction of the cause. Sympathetically read,
the statute would overrule Finley in federal-question, cases but would
still enable the federal courts to retain the pre-Finley rules of diversity
jurisdiction, in keeping with the views outlined in the House Report
that accompanied the statute.77
7

See supranote 43 (providing the text of section 1367).

76For a summary of the rules that govern

the determination of diversity of citizen-

ship and amount in controversy, see infra notes 77-87 and accompanying text.
7 See H.R. REP. No. 101-734, at 27-29 (1990) [hereinafter
HOUSE REPORT] (explaining the need for and effects of the codification of supplementaljurisdiction). For
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This Part of the Article presents the argument for a sympathetic
reading of section 1367. It begins with a review of the rules of pendent and ancillary jurisdiction that developed before Finley, emphasizing the differing operation of those rules in federal-question and diversity proceedings. Next, this Part considers both textual and
structural evidence that section 1367 preserves and incorporates these
pre-Finley differences. Finally, this Part tests the sympathetic reading
in light of predictable arguments against its adoption and concludes
that the sympathetic reading outperforms the standard account of the
statute.
A. Pre-Finley Distinctionsin the Operationof SupplementalJurisdiction
Despite conceptual similarities, the pre-Finleydoctrines of pendent
and ancillary jurisdiction remained quite distinct in the work of the
Supreme Court.7 In addition to its preservation of the nominal distinction between pendent and ancillary jurisdiction, the Court flatly
refused to apply pendentjurisdictional concepts to cases in diversity. 9
Instead, the Court continued to apply rules of law that it had developed in the interpretation of 28 U.S.C. § 1332's ("section 1332") provision for the exercise of diverse-party jurisdiction.80 As a practical
the HOUSE RElORT's discussion of the preservation of diversity, see infra notes 104,

112.
78

See supra text accompanying note 18 (discussing the Supreme Court's develop-

ment of the doctrines of pendent and ancillary jurisdiction in a series of decisions
running well back into the nineteenth century); see alsoPAUL M. BATOR ETAL, HART&
WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYsTEM 1685 n.1 (3d ed. 1988)
(noting the distinction between pendent and ancillary jurisdiction: pendentjurisdic-

tion applies to efforts by plaintiff "(as in Gibbs) tojoin with a federal claim a nonfederal
claim over which the court has no independent basis ofjurisdiction" while ancillary
jurisdiction applies "with respect to claims asserted after the filing of the original complaint").
It was broadly recognized that the pre-nley federal-question doctrine of pendentjurisdiction did not apply to cases based on diversity of citizenship. SeeWRIGHT,
supranote 19, at 158 (noting that most pre-Finly courts "recognized that whatever the

merits, or lack thereof, of th[e] concept [of pendent jurisdiction] to bring in additional parties in cases in which there is a federal question or to overcome problems of
amount in controversy, it was not properly used to avoid the longstanding requirement
of complete diversity"); McLaughlin, supra note 1, at 869 (noting that in pre-iniey
pendent-claimjurisdiction the freestanding claim was a "federal law claim"and distinguishing ancillary jurisdiction as applicable to both federal-question and diversity jurisdiction).

8See, e.g., Zahn v. International Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291, 294-98 (1973).
The Zahn
Court concluded that its interpretation of the term "matter in controversy" in the diversity statute required each member of the class to set up a claim that met the
amount-in-controversy requirement and so refused to apply the doctrine of supple-
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matter, the refusal to import pendentjurisdiction concepts into diversity litigation meant that issues of transactional relationship and litigation convenience-the coin of the realm for supplemental jurisdiction-had far less to do with the scope of the claims a plaintiff might
permissibly join in a diverse-party proceeding than the established
rules of aggregation and complete diversity that the Court had worked
out long before Gibbs came down in 1966.
Consider first the well-established complete-diversity requirement
of Strawbridge v. Curtiss.s 1 Chief Justice Marshall's cryptic opinion in
Strawbridge has come to stand for the proposition that citizens of the
same state may not appear on opposing sides of an action within the
diversity jurisdiction of the federal trial courts. 2 Although it applies
chiefly to section 1332 and does not control the scope of Congress's
power under the diversity grant in Article 111,s the complete-diversity
rule operated to preclude the assertion of many forms of pendentparty jurisdiction in the diversity context. Thus, a citizen of Illinois
may sue a citizen of Texas and properly invoke diversity of citizenship
as the basis ofjurisdiction. But the Illinois citizen may notjoin an additional plaintiff from Texas, or an additional defendant from Illinois,
even if the claims by and against these additional parties would satisfy
the transactional tests of Rule 20 and Gibbs.8 In a complete-diversity
inquiry, then, pendent-party jurisdiction would have no application.
The rules of aggregation similarly confirm the inapplicability of
pendent jurisdiction to claims in diversity. Consider first the aggregation rule that permits a plaintiff to join a series of claims against a diverse defendant to satisfy the jurisdictional amount. Quite in contrast
to the rules of pendentjurisdiction in Gibbs, the aggregation rules do
not require any transactional relationship among the aggregated
claims. 85 Nor do they require that any one of the aggregated claims
satisfy the jurisdictional threshold on its own; the law requires only
mental (ancillary) jurisdiction to permit the joinder of related, but below-threshold,
claims by class members. Id. at 294-98.
81 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806).
82 See id. (holding that jurisdiction based on diversity requires "complete diversity"); see alsoWRIGHT, supra note 19, at 156 (illustrating the complete-diversity rule).
83 See, e.g., State Farm Fire & Gas. Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 523, 530-31 (1967) (holding that the complete-diversity rule does not apply to actions brought under the
authority of the interpleader statute, 28 U.S.G. § 1335, and upholding the constitutionality of the minimal diversity approach of the interpleader statute).
84

See WRIGHT, supra note 19, at 156 (illustrating the operation of the complete-

diversity rule in similar terms).
See id. at 210 (noting the absence of any requirement that claims aggregated to
meet the amount-in-controversy threshold satisfy a test of transactional relationship).
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that the total value of all of the claims meets or exceeds the statutory
minimum.

6

Transactional relationship was equally irrelevant to the

rules of aggregation that governed the joinder of additional parties.
In Snyder v. Harris,the Court ruled that plaintiffs in a class action under Rule 23 may not aggregate the value of their several transactionally related claims to meet the amount-in-controversy requirement.87
The Court expressly based its decision on the statutory reference in
section 1332 to the "matter in controversy" and held that each plaintiff's claim must meet the minimum amount-e Similarly, as noted
above, the decisions in Clark and Zahn preclude the assertion ofjurisdiction over the jurisdictionally insufficient claims of co-plaintiffs,
joined under Rules 20 and 23 respectively, even where one of the
plaintiffs asserts a claim that meets the jurisdictional threshold.8 Like
Snyder, Zahn refused to adopt a test of ancillarity, 0 choosing instead to
rely upon the established jurisdictional rules of diversity to determine
the propriety of hearing the claims of the additional plaintiffs. 9'
In Finley itself, the Court noted this essential distinction between
the operation of supplemental jurisdiction in federal-question and diversity proceedings. Although the Finley Court was willing to assume
that the plaintiff's claims satisfied the constitutional "common nucleus" test for the assertion of pendentjurisdiction identified in Gibbs,
it emphasized that the Gibbs test did not always control supplemental
jurisdictional issues in different jurisdictional contexts. Pointing to
Zahn as an example, the Finley Court noted that a transactional relaSee id. (explaining that unrelated claims, none of which meet the amount-incontroversy threshold, may be aggregated as long as the total value of the claims satisfies the threshold amount).
87 394 U.S. 332 (1969).

See id. at 336-39 (stating that "Congress has... consistently amended the

amount-in-controversy section and re-enacted the 'matter in controversy' language
without change of its jurisdictional effect against a background ofjudicial interpretation" which did not permit aggregation of "separate and distinct claims").
89 See Zahn v. International Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291, 294-98 (1973) (refusing to
permit exercise ofjurisdiction over the claims of unnamed class members, joined under Rule 23, that did not meet the jurisdictional threshold); Clark v. Paul Gray, Inc.,
306 U.S. 583, 589 (1939) (refusing to permit exercise ofjurisdiction overjurisdictionally insufficient claims of additional plaintiffsjoined under Rule 20).
'0 See Zahn, 414 U.S. at 299 (noting that the doctrine of aggregation rests not upon
the transaction-basedjoinder rules of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure but on "this
Court's interpretation of the statutory phrase 'matter in controversy'"); Snyder,394 U.S.
at 336-37 (explaining that the doctrine of aggregation rests upon the Court's interpre-

tation of the phrase "matter-in controversy" as precluding aggregation).
9' See WRIGHT, supra note 19, at 214 (describing Zahn as the "death blow" to the
lower court trend toward the application of the ancillarity principle to the determination of aggregation questions).
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tionship among claims did not alone suffice to establish the existence
of jurisdiction over new parties. As the Finley Court noted in its account of Zahn, "we based this holding upon 'the statutes defining the
jurisdiction of the District Court,' ... and did not so much as mention
Gibbs."
B. RereadingSection 1367 in Light of Pre-FinleyLaw
The Court's continued emphasis on the applicability of the rules
of diversity in cases like Snyder, Clark, and Zahn may explain why section 1367(a) draws a sharp distinction between "original jurisdiction"
and "supplemental jurisdiction." In federal-question cases such as
Gibbs and its progeny, original jurisdiction attached to a federal-law
claim in the plaintiffs well-pleaded complaint; joinder of additional
nonfederal claims triggered the application of the rules of supplemental (pendent) jurisdiction. But in diverse-party litigation, section
1332 and its collection of complete diversity and aggregation rules
93
controlled the plaintiffs ability to join additional claims and parties.

Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545, 550 (1989).

93 Under the rules that govern the timing ofjurisdictional determinations
in diver-

sity, the federal court bases its determination as to the citizenship of the parties on the
facts in the original complaint and does so as of the date of the filing of the action. See
Freeport-McMoRan, Inc. v. K.N. Energy, Inc., 498 U.S. 426, 428 (1991) (discussing "the
well-established rule that diversity of citizenship is assessed at the time the action is
filed"). Butjurisdiction does not attach at the outset for all time. If the plaintiff subsequently proposes to amend the complaint to join a nondiverse party, the district
court must either reject the amendment or dismiss (or remand) the action. See, e.g.,
Hensgens v. Deere & Co., 833 F.2d 1179, 1181-82 (5th Cir. 1987) (specifying test for
scrutiny of post-removal motion by plaintiff to add nondiverse defendant). Similarly,
the district court must dismiss the action if a nondiverse party proposed for joinder
meets the test of indispensability. See Horn v. Lockhart, 84 U.S. 570, 579 (1873) (stating that where nondiverse parties are not indispensable, dismissing such parties is
preferable to joining them and then dismissing the action for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction). The district court, moreover, must align the parties in accordance with
their real interest in the action and must dismiss the action if, as realigned, the parties
do not satisfy the diversity requirement. See, e.g., Indianapolis v. Chase Nat'l Bank, 314
U.S. 63, 69, 74-75 (1941) (explaining that"[d]iversityjurisdiction cannot be conferred
upon the federal courts by the parties' own determination of who are plaintiffs and
who are defendants"). Finally, although the district and appellate courts can dismiss
any non-indispensable parties whose presence would otherwise defeat diversity (jurisdictional "spoilers"), the remaining parties must satisfy the requirements of diversity.
See Newman-Green, Inc. v. Alfonzo-Larrain, 490 U.S. 826, 837 (1989) (holding that
"courts of appeal have the authority to dismiss a dispensable nondiverse party," but
noting that, at the appellate level, such authority should be "exercised sparingly."). See
generally WRIGHT, supra note 19, §§ 28-30, at 171-80 (explaining when parties' diversity
is determined, which parties are considered in that determination, and a court's ability
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District courts sitting in diversity in the pre-Finley era would have had
no occasion to consider supplemental jurisdictional issues until after
the plaintiff had filed a complaint with claims and parties aligned in
ways that satisfied the settled rules of original jurisdiction in section
1332.9 Section 1367(a), with its requirement that "original jurisdiction" first attach to the "claims" in a civil action before the court may
invoke supplemental jurisdiction, thus incorporates the pre-Finley law
distinguishing original from supplementaljurisdiction in diversity. 95
The same statutory distinction between original and supplemental
jurisdiction applies to federal-question litigation but carries less significance in that context. As we have seen, a plaintiff with a substantial federal-law claim under Gibbs was free to invoke the district court's
original jurisdiction over that claim and its supplemental jurisdiction
over a related nonfederal claim in the same well-pleaded complaint.
Original jurisdiction concepts still control and still operate distinctly
from supplemental jurisdiction concepts, but the original jurisdiction
inquiry remains quite discrete and focuses entirely upon the existence
of a substantial federal-law claim.9 To be sure, the Finley Court refused to extend the concept of supplemental jurisdiction to encompass a pendent claim against a new party, finding a lack of statutory
authority in the provision that conferred original jurisdiction on the
district courts in claims against the United States. But Congress reto realign parties).
That supplemental jurisdiction operated differently in federal-question and diversity matters was a commonplace of the pre-Finley scholarship. See, e.g., Freer, supra
note 2, at 62-63 (describing the limits that complete diversity imposes on the plaintiff's
joinder of additional parties; noting the absence of any similar restriction in federalquestion matters; and concluding that courts would have no occasion to reach a pendent-party jurisdiction issue in diversity since the requirements of original jurisdiction
would not have been met).
9- Cf. Peterson v. BASF Corp., 12 F. Supp. 2d 964, 970-71 (D. Minn. 1998) (invoking legislative history to reject claim that section 1367 overrules Zahn and suggesting
that section 1367(a) may incorporate some complete-diversity limits from prior law). I
am indebted to Professor Steinman, who read an early draft of this Article, for bringing the Petersondecision and its reference to the possible incorporation of diversity limits in section 1367(a) to my attention.
Professor Freer made precisely this point, writing some years before the Finley
decision and the adoption of section 1367. Professor Freer first noted that pendentparty concepts had no application to diversity litigation, in light of the completediversity rule. He then distinguished federal-question proceedings, noting that "where
originaljurisdiction is based on the general federal-question statute, the pendent-party
case will present a supplementaljurisdiction problem .... " Freer, supra note 2, at 63.
In suggesting that section 1367(a) differentiates between diversity and federal-question
proceedings, in short, the argument in the text simply urges that the statute carried
forward distinctions that the prior law of original and supplemental jurisdiction had
recognized.
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sponded to that restrictive conception of supplemental jurisdiction by
expressly declaring in section 1367(a) that "[s]uch supplemental jurisdiction shall include claims that involve the joinder or intervention
of additional parties. " 97 Congress cured the Finley problem, in short,
by redefining supplemental jurisdiction to include additional parties
and left the rules of original jurisdiction alone.98
This sympathetic reading of section 1367(a) in light of prior law
has a series of important implications for the interpretation of supplemental jurisdiction under the new statute. Perhaps most significantly, the sympathetic reading preserves the rules of complete diversity and aggregation that the Court had developed in the course of
construing section 1332. As a gloss on the provisions of section 1332,
these rules were understood to govern the plaintiffs joinder of claims
and parties in diversity litigation brought within the original jurisdiction of the district courts. Section 1367(a) appears to incorporate all
of these rules ofjoinder and aggregation by referring to civil actions
"of which the district courts have original jurisdiction."" The language of the statute suggests a neat, if not entirely logical or conceptually consistent, °° distinction between the rules of original jurisdiction in diversity that were to govern the plaintiffs joinder and
aggregation of claims and parties and the rules of ancillary jurisdiction that were to control the defendant's joinder of claims and parties
in subsequent pleadings.
In preserving a broader array of rules to govern original jurisdiction over additional claims and parties in diversity than in federalquestion proceedings, section 1367(a) leaves in place a distinction between pendent and ancillary jurisdiction that had grown up in prior
cases. As we have seen, the pre-Finley decisions steadfastly refused to
apply pendent jurisdiction concepts to diversity matters. Rather, the
established body of law governing complete-diversity and aggregation
continued to govern the plaintiffs initial assertion of claims. The ref-

28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (1994). Commentators agree that the statute accomplished
the goal of overturning Finley by including this explicit provision for the exercise of
pendent-party jurisdiction. See, e.g., Freer, Life After Finley, supra note 3, at 473 (approving of the implicit overruling of Finley).
On this account, then, the statute directly overrules Finley by including additional parties within the ambit of supplemental jurisdiction that the plaintiff may invoke, as in Gibbs, at the initial pleading stage.
'9 See supranote 43 (setting forth the text of section 1367).
1WFor a criticism of this absence of conceptual consistency, see ALI DRAFr, supra
note 9, at xvi, 58 (describing current section 1367 as "imperfectly articulated in claimspecific terms").
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erence in section 1367(a) to the necessity of first securing "original
jurisdiction" makes it clear that these joinder and aggregation rules
would continue to control in diversity litigation. The provision for the
exercise of supplemental jurisdiction over claims related to those
"within such original jurisdiction" can only sensibly refer, at least in
the diversity context, to the established doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction, which traditionally applied to the claims and parties joined in
subsequent pleadings filed by defendants and intervening pares. 1 01
This sympathetic reading of section 1367(a) fits well with the language and structure of subsequent provisions of section 1367.102 Consider first the provisions of section 1367(b), which specify a variety of
situations in which the district courts, sitting in diversity, may not exercise the supplemental jurisdiction that has been conferred upon
them in subsection (a). The statute bars such jurisdiction "over claims
by plaintiffs against persons made parties under Rule 14, 19, 20, or 24"
of the Federal Rules and over "claims by persons proposed to be
joined as plaintiffs under Rule 19" when exercising such jurisdiction
would be inconsistent with the jurisdictional requirements of section
1332.203 The statute reflects a concern with the preservation of the
rules of diversity and a desire to preclude the grants of supplemental
(ancillary) jurisdiction from eroding those rules.
More than merely confirming a general spirit of cautious restatement, subsection (b) offers strong structural support for a sympathetic
interpretation of the scope of subsection (a)'s grant of supplemental
jurisdiction in diversity. The exceptions specified in subsection (b)
operate as a bar to the assertion of jurisdiction over claims that plain10

See McLaughlin, supranote 1, at 874 (noting that ancillaryjurisdiction applies to

claims "asserted in an ongoing federal lawsuit after the filing of the original complaint"); FRIEDENTHAL ETAL, supra note 19, §§ 2.12, 2.14 at 65-67, 76-81 (same).
'02 It bears noting that the distinctive operation of supplemental jurisdiction in
federal-question and diversity matters parallels a well-known distinction in these two
familiar sources ofjudicial power. As ChiefJustice John Marshall noted, Article III of
the Constitution distinguishes between federal-question "cases" (jurisdiction "depends
on the character of the cause," and not on the identity of the parties) and party-based
"controversies" ("jurisdiction depends entirely on the character of the parties"). Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 378 (1816). See generallyJames E. Pfander,
Rethinkingthe Supreme Court's OriginalJurisdictionin State-Party Cases,82 CAL. L. REv. 555,
604-17 (1994) (discussing the distinction and its implications for the interpretation of
Article III). Even though this constitutional distinction has no immediate relevance to
the proper interpretation of the statute, it may help to explain why the doctrine of
pendent parties met resistance in the diversity context. Cf Freer, supranote 2, at 62-63
(noting the difference between the subject-matter focus of federal-question jurisdiction and the party-based focus of diversity jurisdiction).
103 See supranote 43 (setting forth section 1367).
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tiffs would propose to bring, not in the first instance, but in response
to other claims that have been inserted into the proceeding by other
parties. Subsection (b)'s exception for claims by plaintiffs against persons made parties under Rule 14 offers a definitive illustration. All
commentators agree that the reference to Rule 14 codifies the Supreme Court rule in Kroger,TM a case in which the Court refused to
permit the district court to assert ancillary jurisdiction over the plaintiff's claim against a nondiverse party joined by the defendant under
Rule 14.105 The Kroger Court laid special emphasis on the fact that the
ordinary rules of diversity jurisdiction would bar the plaintiff from asserting claims against the nondiverse defendant in the first instance.1 6
Unwilling to permit an end-run around this rule of complete diversity,
the Kroger Court adopted a narrow interpretation of ancillary jurisdiction. Although the Court seemingly agreed to permit the assertion of
ancillary jurisdiction over the impleader claims of defendants under
Rule 14, and in other settings,0 7 the Court refused to countenance the
expansion of ancillary jurisdiction to encompass a Rule 14 claim by
the plaintiff against the newly impleaded defendant.
Notice how closely the underlying structure of section 1367 follows the rationale of Kroger. Subsection (a), sympathetically read, preserves the rules of complete diversity and confers supplemental (ancillary) jurisdiction over new claims and parties joined in pleadings
subsequent to the plaintiff's initial complaint. But subsection (b), like
Kroger, creates a restriction on the scope of such ancillary jurisdiction
to preserve the essential features of the complete diversity requirement. In other words, the ancillary focus of the exceptions in subsection (b) tends to confirm that the grant of supplemental jurisdiction
in subsection (a) operates in effect as a grant of ancillary jurisdiction." 8 Because Congress had preserved the rules of complete diver1'4 See, e.g., McLaughlin, supra note 1, at 935-38 (describing the manner in which

section 1367(b) codifies and extends the rule of Kroger).
105 See Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 377 (1978) (holding
that the "policy of [section 1332] calls for its strict construction" and that "[t]o allow
the requirement of complete diversity to be circumvented as it was in this case would

simply flout the congressional command" (citations omitted)).
' Id. at 373-74 (citing Strawbidgeand Zahn).
107 Id at 375 n.18 (citing with apparent approval lower court decisions that had asserted ancillary jurisdiction over compulsory counterclaims, cross-claims, impleader

claims, and claims by intervenors as of right).
'05The remaining exceptions in section 1367(b) also focus on the containment of
ancillary jurisdiction. In foreclosing jurisdiction over claims by plaintiffs against persons joined under Rules 19 and 24, subsection (b) seeks to preserve the rule that ancillary jurisdiction does not extend to necessary parties (Rule 19) and to produce the
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sity and aggregation in subsection (a), it was simply unnecessary for
Congress to establish exceptions in subsection (b) other than those
necessary to rein in the scope of ancillary jurisdiction and to preserve
the result in Kroger.
C. Testing the Sympathetic Reading

1. The Grant of SupplementalJurisdiction
Notwithstanding the tight fit between the sympathetic reading and
the language, structure, and legislative history of the statute,1' 9 one
can imagine plausible, if ultimately unconvincing, arguments against
the interpretation. Consider first the argument that, by using the
term "supplemental jurisdiction" in section 1367(a), Congress must
have intended to bring the doctrines of pendent and ancillary jurisdiction into congruence rather than to preserve their differences under a new label. On this account, the plenary grant of supplemental
jurisdiction in section 1367(a) operates identically in both federalquestion and diversity cases and extends to the boundaries of a constisame result with respect to those who intervene as defendants (Rule 24). See generally
Rowe et al., A Reply, supra note 3, at 955-59 (discussing the statute's resolution of the
necessary-party/intervention anomaly). Original diversityjurisdiction did not attach to
such claims under pre-Finley decisional law; rather, such claims were analyzed under
the rules of ancillarity. See, e.g., 7 CHARLEs ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE § 1610, at 150-54 (2d ed. 1986) (treating, in pre-1iney discussion, the
Rule 19/24 anomaly as a question of ancillaryjurisdiction). For an ancillary interpretation of the reference to Rule 20, see infra notes 113-19.
"9 If the language and structure of the statute reveal a desire on the part of Congress to maintain the rules of diversity and to authorize ancillaryjurisdiction only insofar as that jurisdiction poses no threat to those rules, then the legislative history provides additional confirmation. The House Judiciary Committee Report explains that
the statute responds to Finley by providing statutory authority to hear supplemental
claims, including claims involving the joinder of additional parties. But the Report
also suggests quite clearly that its codification of the rules of supplementaljurisdiction
will preserve an existing distinction between federal-question and diversity litigation:
In federal-question cases, it broadly authorizes the district courts to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over additional claims, including claims involving
thejoinder of additional parties. In diversity cases, the district courts may exercise supplemental jurisdiction, except when doing so would be inconsistent
with the jurisdictional requirements of the diversity statute.
HousE REPORT, supranote 77, at 28. The Report thus confirms that the statute leaves
in place the rules governing the assertion of original jurisdiction in diversity proceedings, including the rules ofjoinder and aggregation that govern original jurisdiction of
the plaintiff's initial complaint. The same conclusion emerges from the Report's further statement that the "section is not intended to affect the jurisdictional requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1332 in diversity-only class actions, as those requirements were
interpreted prior to Finley." Id. at 29.
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tutional "case" under Article III.1'0 Something like this argument, or
this unspoken assumption, informs virtually every published account
of section 1367 and deserves to be taken seriously."' Indeed, many
observers who have otherwise found much to criticize in the statute
have applauded Congress's decision to end the pendent/ancillary distinction through adoption of the supplemental label.'
I share the view that we should strive for doctrinal coherence in
the application of supplemental jurisdiction concepts, but I do not believe that such a goal requires that we view the use of the term supplemental jurisdiction as reflecting a congressional decision to import
pendent jurisdictional concepts into diversity litigation. On my account of the statute, supplemental jurisdiction can operate just as it
did in the pre-Finley era. In federal-question litigation, the rules of
original jurisdiction require only a substantial federal-law claim for
supplemental (pendent) jurisdiction to support the adjudication of
the plaintiffs additional, nonfederal claims. In diversity litigation, by
contrast, the rules of original jurisdiction governjoinder and aggregation issues in the plaintiff s complaint and supplemental (ancillary)
jurisdiction applies to the subsequent joinder of claims and parties.
In conceptual terms, supplemental jurisdiction operates in the same
way in both settings, coming into play only after the demands of
original jurisdiction have been satisfied and applying to claims that
satisfy the transactional relationship test of Article III. On this account, the same test of transactional relationship might well apply in
both the federal-question and diversity contexts, thus achieving a
measure of doctrinal coherence. At the same time, section 1367(a)'s
preservation of the rules of original jurisdiction would, at least in diversity proceedings, defer the application of this supplemental jurisdictional analysis until after the complaint passed muster. It may well
prove useful to continue to talk of pendent and ancillary jurisdiction
to keep these distinctions straight, as many scholars have done in writing about the operation of the statute. 13 Still, the crucial statutory disSee suprq note 43 (setting forth the text of section 1367).
See supra note 16 (citing articles which view subsection (a) as a broad grant of
supplemental jurisdiction).
112 See, e.g., Freer, Life AfterFinley, supra note 3, at 473 (noting that the use of the

term "supplemental jurisdiction" reflects a "clear trend" in case law and academic literature); McLaughlin, supra note 1, at 860 (referring to the abolition of the pendent
and ancillary labels as "beneficial").
113
See, e.g., McLaughlin, supra note 1, at 925 (noting that the statute can be understood by referring to the former doctrines of pendent-claim, pendent-party and ancillaryjurisdiction).
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tinction lies in its incorporation of the rules of original jurisdiction,
which govern a much broader array ofjoinder and aggregation issues
in diversity than in federal-question litigation. Once jurisdiction attaches, the statutory grant of supplementajurisdiction may operate in
much the same way in a variety of settings. What we used to think of
as ancillary jurisdiction, for example, would continue
to be available
14
in both federal-question and diversity litigation.'
One can, in short, read Congress's decision to provide for the exercise of "supplemental jurisdiction" as something other than a directive to achieve precisely the same outcomes in both federal-question
and diversity litigation. Congress did not express any desire to change
the manner in which the doctrine operates in discrete cases (aside
from its provision for the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction over
additional parties). After all, the statute did not coin the term "supplemental jurisdiction"; scholars had previously used the term to refer
to both pendent and ancillaryjurisdiction.us The statute's use of the
phrase, therefore, conveys no desire to change the established operation of the underlying doctrine. Indeed, the Finley decision itself invoked a canon of construction under which a codification of existing
jurisdictional practices would presumptively carry forward past interpretations unless that statute contains some clear expression of congressional intent to depart from the settled rule.Y6 One can scarcely
discover an intent to change the law in Congress's decision to use the
supplemental label standing alone, particularly in view of its drafters'
avowed desire to avoid controversy. If one were inclined to consider
it, moreover, the legislative history
expressly disclaims any intention to
17
make broad changes in the law.
See id. at 874 (noting that, unlike pendentjurisdiction, ancillary jurisdiction applied whether the original jurisdiction claim was founded on a federal question, diversity of citizenship, or some other basis).
"1

's See supranote 2 (citing earlier use of the term "supplementaljurisdiction").
116 See supranote 42 (discussing
Finley).
1 The clearest evidence in the legislative history appears in the
House Judiciary
Report, which includes the following statement:
The doctrines of pendent and ancillary jurisdiction, in this section jointly labeled supplementaljurisdiction, refer to the authority of the federal courts to
adjudicate... [nonfederal] claims [that meet the test of Gibbs]....
... This section would authorize jurisdiction in a case like Finley, as well as
essentially restore the pre-Finey understandings of the authorization for and
limits on other forms of supplementaljurisdiction.
HOUSE REPORT, supranote 77, at 27-28. These statements, in a Report that emphasizes
a desire on Congress's part to restore understandings of the "limits" on other, preFinleyforms of supplementaljurisdiction, provide the backdrop for a sympathetic read-
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The congressional disclaimer corresponds to the conclusion that
emerges from a consideration of the correspondence among the
drafters of the supplemental jurisdiction statute. In the Explanation
that accompanied a discarded version of the statute, the authors expressly stated that the "purpose of the proposal is to codify the judicially created doctrines of pendent and ancillary jurisdiction as the
Federal Courts Study Committee recommended.""' In reviewing that
draft, one of the three principal drafters of the final version of section
1367 expressed "complete support" for the proposal to "codify the
doctrines of pendent and ancillary jurisdiction.""s Although the
terms of the codification changed over the course of the next few
weeks, the correspondence of the drafters reveals no departure from
this fundamental desire to codify pendent and ancillary jurisdiction.
Indeed, the apparent focus of the drafters was to rewrite the draft
statute to preserve the rule in Kroger and to bring the rules governing
the assertion of diversity jurisdiction over parties
joined under Rules
20
19 and 24 into congruence with Krogers spirit.1
ing of the statute.
"1 Hearingon H.R. 5381 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual Prerty, and the
Administration of the Justice of the House Comm. on theJudiciary, 101st Cong. 689 (1990)
[hereinafter Hearing] (Explanation of the Proposal to Codify Supplemental Jurisdiction accompanying Letter from Arthur D. Wolf, Professor, Western New England College School of Law, to Robert W. Kastenmeier, Chairman, Subcommittee on Courts,
Intellectual Property, and the Administration of theJustice (June 8, 1990)). Although
the Wolf draft appeared in H.R. 5381 as late as September 6, 1990, Congress later
chose to adopt a substitute measure that was largely the work of Professors Mengler,
Rowe, and Burbank. See Fairman, supra note 4, at 160-70 (recounting the progression
of drafts from that of Wolf, to the substitute ofJudge Weis, and finally to the September 11, 1990 draft that became law).
"9 Letter from Thomas M. Mengler, Professor, University of Illinois at UrbanaChampaign College of Law, to Robert W. Kastenmeier, Chairman, Subcommittee on
Courts, Intellectual Property, and the Administration of the Justice (June 13, 1990), in
Hearing supranote 118, at 701.
'20 One can see this focus on the problems associated with diversityjurisdiction and
the preservation of Kroger in the correspondence of Professor Burbank, Professor
Mengler, and Professor Kramer, a consultant to the Federal Courts Study Committee.
See Letter from Stephen B. Burbank, Professor, University of Pennsylvania Law School,
to Thomas M. Mengler, Professor, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign College
of Law (Aug. 14, 1990), in Hearing,supra note 118, at 706-07 (raising the question of
whether Krogerwould be overruled by the proposed statute); Letter from Thomas M.
Mengler to Stephen B. Burbank (August 24, 1990), in Hearing,supra note 118, at 70809 (affirming that the proposed language would overrule Kroger); Letter from Larry
Kramer, Professor, University of Michigan Law School, to Joseph F. Weis Jr., Judge,
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit (Aug. 31, 1990), in Hearing supra
note 118, at 713, 714-15 (arguing that an early draft of section 1367(b) that had appeared in the working papers of the Federal Courts Study Committee and that ultimately became the vehicle the drafters relied upon in crafting the statute avoided the
problem of overruling Kroger by "preserving pre-Finkey limitations on pendentjurisdic-
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One finds an echo, perhaps unconscious, of the drafters' desire to
preserve the distinction between pendent and ancillary jurisdiction in
the terms of the statute itself. The statute refers to the existence of
original jurisdiction over the "claims" in a "civil action" and thus appears to reject the notion that a single, jurisdictionally sufficient claim
will support the exercise of plenary pendent jurisdiction in diversity
matters. Previous decisions as to the scope of diversity jurisdiction
scrutinized the claims and parties in the action as a whole for compliance with the requirements of section 1332; as noted above, a single,
jurisdictionally sufficient claim would not have supported the joinder
of nondiverse parties orjurisdictionally insufficient claims. In its focus
on the need for jurisdiction over the claims in a civil action, section
1367 decisively differs from the conceptual apparatus of the ALI Draft.
The ALI Draft aims to transform the operation of supplemental jurisdiction by treating anyjurisdictionally sufficient claim (including one
in diversity) as a "freestanding" claim that will, by definition, support
the assertion ofjurisdiction over supplemental claims that satisfy the
case-or-controversy test of relatedness. There may be good reasons to
shift from an action-specific focus to a claim-specific focus, as the ALI
Draft suggests, but there is no reason to believe that Congress had anticipated that change in the law when it enacted section 1367. Rather,
the statute appears to preserve the action-specific focus of the rules of
complete diversity and aggregation that had evolved up to that point.
2. Jurisdiction over Civil Actions and the Overruling of Finley
To the extent that section 1367(a) operates in diversity only after
the district court first secures original jurisdiction over the civil action,
one might doubt its effectiveness in overruling Finley in federalquestion cases.' 2 1 Finley held that the jurisdiction of the district courts
under the FTCA extends to claims against the United States but does
not reach related state-law claims against nondiverse pendent parties.In Section 1367(a) set out to overrule Finley by conferring supplemental jurisdiction on the district courts and by making it clear
that such jurisdiction includes claims against new parties. But as we
have seen, the statute provides for the assertion of supplemental jurisdiction only after the district court has acquired original jurisdiction
over the civil action. So while a district court was free (before section
tion in diversity cases").
1I
'2

am indebted to David Shapiro for drawing this possibility to my attention.
See supranotes 36-42 and accompanying text (describing Fin!e's holding).
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1367's enactment) to exercise original jurisdiction over a federalquestion claim against a single defendant, Finley itself concluded that
such original jurisdiction did not extend to related state-law claims
against additional, nondiverse parties.Iss Lacking original jurisdiction
over all of the plaintiff's claims in the civil action, the district court in
a case like Finley may appear to lack the statutory predicate for bringing section 1367(a)'s grant of supplemental jurisdiction into play. In
other words, as one treatise noted in analyzing the problem addressed
here, "if the courts applied the language of § 1367(a) literally,
it
24
would defeat the main purpose of the statute-overruling Finley."1
In contrast, I believe that the literal terms of section 1367(a) can
both preserve the rules of original jurisdiction in diversity and secure
the overruling of Finley. Although Finley ruled out pendent-partyjurisdiction in federal-question cases, it did leave pendent-claim jurisdiction and the rule of Gibbs intact. ' 2- The preservation of Gibbs, however,
coexists uneasily with the Finley Court's emphasis on the need for written statutory authority; the absence of written authority that Finley
read to foreclose jurisdiction over claims against pendent parties appeared to many to plague the assertion of pendent-claim jurisdiction
as well. The drafters of section 1367(a) thus set out to provide statutory authority for both Gibbs and Finley and did so in that portion of
the statute that confers supplemental jurisdiction over "all other
claims that are so related to claims in the action within such original
jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy under
Article III." This language, clearly meant to codify Gibbs, assumes that
the district court will hear pendent claims in a federal-question proceeding not as part of the court's original jurisdiction over a civil action but as part of the statutorily conferred grant of supplemental jurisdiction. 127 The statute thus resolves the anomalous status of Gibbs
See Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545, 553, 556 (1989).
LARRYL. TEPLY& RALPH U. WH1TEN, CIVIL PROCEDURE 124 (1994).
'2 See Finey, 490 U.S. at 549-51, 556 (distinguishing pendent-claim from pendent2

124

party jurisdiction and expressing no desire to impair the continuing vitality of Gibbs,
despite the fact that it departed from past practice in asserting jurisdiction without
statutory authority).
1
See supra note 42 and accompanying text (describing concerns over the breadth
of Finley's holding).
12 Most observers agree that the grant of supplemental jurisdiction
over related
claims in section 1367(a) codifies the pendent-claim jurisdiction rule in Gibbs. See, e.g.,
McLaughlin, supra note 1, at 925. Yet the logic of the action-specific focus that Professors Teply and Whitten rely upon in doubting the statute's effectiveness in overruling
Finey would also render the statute essentially irrelevant to pendent-claim jurisdiction.
See TEPLY & WHiTrEN, supra note 124, at 123-24. The Teply-Whitten approach reads
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after Finley by defining pendent-claim jurisdiction as part of the district court's supplemental, not original,jurisdiction. 2 s
The statute's treatment of pendent claims as lying within the district court's supplemental jurisdiction helps to make clear that the
statute authorizes supplemental jurisdiction over pendent parties as
well. Immediately following the grant of supplemental jurisdiction,
the statute provides that "[s]uch supplemental jurisdiction shall include claims that involve thejoinder or intervention of additional parties."' 29 In effect, then, the statute provides for pendent-partyjurisdiction by providing a statutory foundation for Gibbs, and by extending
such jurisdiction to include the addition of new, pendent parties. It
thus assumes that a single "freestanding" or jurisdictionally sufficient
federal-question claim will bring into play the district court's supplemental jurisdiction over related claims; in other words, the statute
continues and codifies the claim-specific approach to pendentjurisdiction in federal-question cases that the Gibbs Court had developed.
Such an approach belies the argument that district courts must defer
their inquiry into the existence of supplemental jurisdiction until after
the rigorous original jurisdiction demands of Finley have first been
met.
3. The Rule 20 Wrinkle
One might also argue that the sympathetic reading of the statute
cannot well account for the appearance in subsection (b) of a provision that restricts supplemental jurisdiction over claims by plaintiffs

section 1367(a) as preserving pre-codification rules of supplemental jurisdiction in
federal-question cases and would presumably include the Gibbsrule within the scope of

the district courts' originaljurisdiction. On such a reading, the grant of supplemental
jurisdiction in section 1367(a) over related claims would be redundant ofjurisdiction
already available as an original matter. It makes a good deal more sense, I submit, to
read section 1367(a) as conferring supplemental jurisdiction over pendent claims and
thus to confirm a claim-specific approach to federal-questionjurisdiction.
' In describing Gibbs as anomalous after Finey, I simply mean to note that the rationale of Finley's insistence upon written statutory authorization raised doubts as to
whether existing jurisdictional statutes conferred pendent-claim jurisdiction on the
district courts. On the one hand, Fney expressly refused to treat the statutory grant of
jurisdiction over a "civil action" as having acquired a judge-made gloss that included
supplementaljurisdiction. See supra note 42. On the other hand, the Finey Court expressed no desire to impair Gibbs. See supranote 125. Finey thus left it uncertain as to
whether a district court's pendent-claim jurisdiction under Gibbs would come into play
as part of its originajurisdiction or as part of supplementaljurisdiction.
29 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (1994). See supra note 43 for the full text of the statute.
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against persons made parties under Rule 2 0 .iss The Rule 20 exception
plays a major role in the standard account of section 1367, operating
as an important restriction on the otherwise broad grant of supplemental jurisdiction in diversity matters conferred in subsection (a).s'
In contrast to the standard account, the sympathetic reading posits
that section 1367(a) incorporates the complete-diversity rules that
preclude plaintiffs from joining additional, nondiverse defendants
under Rule 20. If subsection (a) already precludes the plaintiffs from
joining nondiverse defendants, one might plausibly ask why subsection (b) also includes language to foreclose the assertion of claims by
plaintiffs against persons made parties under Rule 20. The standard
account of the reference to Rule 20 in section 1367(b), in short, appears to undermine the sympathetic reading of section 1367(a).
But one can develop a sympathetic alternative to the standard account of the Rule 20 reference that fits well with the interpretation of
section 136 7 (a) proposed in this Article. Recall that section 1367(b)
seeks to protect complete diversity from situations, like that in Kroger,
in which plaintiffs seek to rely upon the district court's ancillaryjurisdiction over claims they assert against nondiverse defendants that others have joined to the litigation. In its effort to prevent an erosion of
complete diversity through such ancillary jurisdiction, section 1367(b)
deliberately uses the passive voice. Subsection (b) does not directly
bar plaintiffs from joining nondiverse defendants under Rule 20;
rather, it declares that plaintiffs may not assert claims against "persons
made parties" under Rule 20. The statute thus can be read to contemplate that the persons in question will have been made parties by
someone other than the plaintiff; the language of section 1367(b) literally addresses itself to the plaintiff's subsequent assertion of claims

130Rule 20 provides in relevant part that all parties may join as plaintiffs in an action "if they assert any right to relief... arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences and if any question of law or fact common to all these persons will arise in the action"; the same transactional test governs
thejoinder of multiple defendants. FED. R.CIV. P. 20(a).
11 See, e.g., Stromberg Metal Works, Inc. v. Press Mech.,
Inc., 77 F.3d 928, 931-32
(7th Cir. 1996) (noting the Rule 20 limits on the otherwise broad scope of section
1367(a)); ALI DRAFr, supranote 9, at 68 (describing the effect of the reference to Rule
20 as withdrawing supplemental jurisdiction over claims against additional defendants
joined under that rule, but as failing to withdraw such jurisdiction over claims by additional plaintiffs joined under the same rule and ascribing the difference in treatment
to an error in drafting); Rowe et al., A Reply, supra note 3, at 961 n.91 (relying on the
reference to Rule 20 in arguing that the statute preserved so much of the completediversity requirement as relates to thejoinder of nondiverse defendants).
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1 2
against these new parties.
The Federal Rules furnish examples of situations in which defendants may join additional parties under the transactional test of Rule
20: Rule 13(a) specifies that a defendant must assert an available,
transactionally related "compulsory" counterclaim against an opposing party and Rule 13(g) authorizes a cross-claim against a co-party.1
(Rule 14 incorporates similar joinder rules in permitting impleaded
third-party defendants to set up counterclaims and cross-claims under
Rule 13.)134 Once a new claim has been asserted under these Rules,
Rule 13(h) expressly permits a defendant to join additional defendants as parties to these counterclaims and cross-claims,'35 so long as

One can probably best explain the reference to Rule 20 as a drafting error, indeed, most accounts of the statute adopt that view. See, e.g., Rowe et al., A Reply, supra
note 3, at 961 n.91 (describing the omission of claims by plaintiffs,joined under Rule
20, as a "far more serious" problem than others the critics had identified); Steinman,
supra note 16, at 100-01 (raising doubts about the nature of the error and maintaining
that Rules 15 and 21, rather than Rule 20, are the proper rules for adding parties postfiling). It appears that the error resulted from an excess of caution on the part of the
drafters. Although they had framed a statute that sought to preserve the completediversity requirement, last-second concerns led them to add a reference to Rule 20 in
the limiting provisions in section 1367(b). CompareLetter from Thomas M. Mengler,
Professor, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign College of Law, to Thomas D.
Rowe, Jr., Professor, Duke University School of Law (Aug. 28 1990), in Hearing,supra
note 118, at 716-17 (describing his changes to a draft of 1367(b) and listing exceptions
for claims by plaintiffs against parties joined under Rules 14, 19, and 24, but omitting
any reference to Rule 20), with Draft, prepared by Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Stephen B.
Burbank & Thomas M. Mengler, Sept. 11, 1990, in Hearing,supra note 118, at 722 (including in section 1367(b) an exception for claims against persons made parties under
Rule 20 and suggesting that the addition of Rule 20 occurred in early September). See
also Fairman, supra note 4, at 166-69 (tracing the progression of drafts and noting in
particular that the reference to Rule 20 first appeared in the September 11 draft of
Rowe, Burbank, and Mengler). Similar last-second concerns prompted the drafters to
worry about their failure to include a restriction for claimsjoined under Rule 23. They
caught the Rule 23 implications too late, however, to address with a change to the
statutory language and so relied upon a curative reference in the legislative history instead. See Rowe et al., A Reply, supra note 3, at 960 n.90 (describing the attempt to address the Rule 23 problem through a curative reference in the legislative history).
These concerns reflect an acceptance of what I have called the standard account, resting as they do on the view that section 1367(a) conferred a broad grant of supplemental (pendent-party) jurisdiction in diversity matters. The curative efforts reveal that the
drafters did not read section 1367(a) itself as an adequate defense of the completediversity requirement.
FED. R. CIV. P. 13(a), 13(g).
2

"

13

FED. R. CIV. P. 14(a).
FED. R. CIV. P. 13(h) (specifying that persons "other than those made parties to

the original action may be made parties to a counterclaim or cross-claim in accordance
with the provisions of Rules 19 and 20"). Cf.TEPLY& WHITrEN, supra note 124, at 13233 n.295 (suggesting a similar interpretation of the Rule 20 reference as applicable to
ancillaryjurisdiction over partiesjoined under Rule 13 (h)).

146

UNIVERSITY OFPENNSYLVANIA LAWREVIEW

[Vol. 148:109

the claims against such new parties satisfy the transactional test of
Rule 20."6 Section 1367(a) extends the district court's ancillary jurisdiction to the claims that defendants assert against such newly joined
parties. But the Rule 20 exception in section 1367(b) can be read to
follow Kroger in refraining from permitting the plaintiffs to assert
claims against them in circumstances that might erode the complete
diversity requirement-137 So read, the Rule 20 exception conforms to
the general thrust of section 1367(b), which, sympathetically read,
operates not as a constraint on what the plaintiff does in the initial
complaint but on what the plaintiff does later with respect to subsequently joined parties.
Although a sympathetic reading of the Rule 20 exception does not
conform to the drafters' understanding of section 1367(b)'s operation, it may make as much sense as the standard account. For one
thing, the standard account of the Rule 20 exception contains its own
shortcomings. Most importantly, the exception fails to preclude the
plaintiff from filing a diversity action and later moving to join additional, nondiverse plaintiffs under Rule 20 as parties within the grant
of supplemental jurisdiction in section 1367(a). The sympathetic account of the statute avoids what the drafters rightly termed this "gaping hole" in the complete-diversity rule.'38 Moreover, the sympathetic
account of the Rule 20 exception makes better sense of the subsequent language in section 1367(b). Recall that section 1367(b) does
not operate as a flat bar to the assertion of supplemental jurisdiction
13 FED. R. Civ. P. 13(h). To be sure, some observers have taken issue with functional interpretation of the reference in section 1367 to Rule 20, arguing that its rule
of transactional relationship for the joinder of parties does not actually provide a
measure of the propriety of such joinder in the context of pending litigation. See
Steinman, supranote 16, at 100-01 (arguing that Rule 20joinder does not apply to the
addition of parties post-filing). These observers argue that the statute should have referred instead to Rule 15 as the rule that actually provides the standard for leave to
amend the pleadings to add additional parties. ML I do not share this criticism of the
statute's reference to Rule 20. All of the rules referred to in the statute set forth a test
of transactional relationship. It is these tests of transactional relationship, and not
general standards for amendment of the pleadings, that inform the questions ofjoinder and supplemental jurisdiction in the course of motions for leave to amend under
Rule 15.
'37 Of course, one might argue that the proposed interpretation of the Rule 20 reference suffers from redundancy insofar as it incorporates thejoinder rules in Rule 14,
which appears as a separate exception in section 1367(b). Yet one can see the rules as
performing discrete functions: the reference to Rule 14 incorporates the test for the
impleader of third-party defendants (as in Kroger) and Rule 20 governs the assertion of
claims against parties added to the litigation in connection with counterclaims and
cross-claims allowed under Rule 13.
"' See supra note 65 (quoting the statute's drafters).
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over claims by plaintiffs but only bars the jurisdiction when it would be
"inconsistent with the jurisdictional requirements of section 1332. " m
One has difficulty seeing how a district court could possibly find that
an action in which plaintiffs have invoked Rule 20 to join nondiverse
defendants would be consistent with the complete diversity rules of
Strawbridgev. Curtiss. But the assertion of claims by plaintiffs against
persons made parties under Rule 20 by someone other than the plaintiff might have a less dramatic tendency to erode the complete diversity rule, at least so long as the proposed joinder did not present the
threat of strategic manipulation that persuaded the Court to enforce
the complete diversity rule in Kroger.
D. Applying the Sympathetic Reading
Sympathetically read, section 1367 produces results that closely
conform to the House Report's assertion that the statute was meant to
preserve thejurisdictional requirements of the diversity statute. Recall
that section 1367(a) provides for the assertion of supplemental jurisdiction only after "original jurisdiction" has attached to the claims in
the plaintiffs complaint. This means that section 1367(a) does much
of the work of preserving diversity by incorporating the rules of complete diversity into that term. While section 1367(a) makes ancillary
jurisdiction available after the rules of complete diversity have been
satisfied and jurisdiction attaches, section 1367(b) creates exceptions
to the scope of such ancillary jurisdiction
to provide further protec40
tion for the rule of complete diversity.
" 28 U.S.C. § 1367(b) (1994).
,40Professors Tidmarsh and Transgrud have suggested an "alternate" reading of
section 1367(b) that would make its restrictive provisions inapplicable to cases such as
Abbott Laboratoriesand Stromberg. SeeJAYTDMARSH & ROGER H. TRANsGRUD, COMPLEX
LITIGATION AND THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM 355-56 (1998). In constructing their alternative, Professors Tidmarsh and Transgrud emphasize the language that limits the application of section 1367(b) to matters founded "solely on section 1332." Id. at 355. They
note that Abbott Laboratoriesand Strombergfail to satisfy the demands of complete diversity (as understood in cases decided before the statute became law) and could on this
account fall outside section 1367(b) power such that the provisions in section 1367(b)

do not come into play. Id. They also note that Snydermay present a different question
from that in Zahn, inasmuch as none of the claims in Snyder came within the district
court's original diversityjurisdiction. Ik at 356.

While this alternate reading focuses on the interplay between sections 1367(a) and
(b) and offers an interesting textual alternative to Abbott Laboratoriesand Stromberg, it
differs in important respects from (and thus presents problems that do not plague) the
sympathetic account. For example, the authors of the alternate reading struggle with
what they see as a problem of tautology; if section 1367(a) permits less than complete
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1. Preserving Zahn and Clark
The sympathetic reading of section 1367 produces results wholly
consistent with the legislative history and remains true to the language
of the statute that Congress adopted. It, thus dissolves the apparent
tension, reported in cases such as Abbott Laboratoriesand Stromberg between the supposedly clear results demanded by the literal text and
the more modest claims in the legislative history. The Abbott Laboratories court mistakenly assumed that section 1367(a) conferred a plenary
grant of pendentjurisdiction on the federal courts, sitting in diversity.
With such a grant in place, the court looked for exceptions in section
1367(b). Finding no exception there for claims brought by additional
parties joined as plaintiffs under Rule 23, the Abbott Laboratoriescourt
concluded that Congress had unthinkingly overruled Zahn. The
Strombergcourt ascribed the same interpretive significance to the omission of thejoinder of plaintiffs under Rule 20 in the course of its decision to regard section 1367 as a legislative overruling of the Clark rule.
Both courts erred in looking for an explicit exception on the face
of section 1367(b). The exceptions appear instead in the requirement that "original jurisdiction" attach to the complaint of the plaintiffs in section 1367(a). The established rules of Zahn and Clark form
a part of the jurisdictional requirements in diversity proceedings, and
they were both incorporated into section 1367(a) by reference. Congress thus had no reason to create any explicit exception in 1367(b)
for claims by plaintiffs joined under either Rule 23 or Rule 20. Jurisdiction over claims entailed in thejoinder of additional plaintiffs had
always required that those plaintiffs meet the amount-in-controversy
requirement; the Zahn Court had explicitly refused to substitute the
diversity, then that leaves little for the diversity-linked provisions of section 1367(b) to
accomplish. Id. at 355. But if one sees section 1367(b) as operating in the diversity
context to cabin the doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction that comes into play only after
the rules of original diversityjurisdiction have been satisfied (as in the sympathetic account), then 1367(b) can still play a useful role. Similarly, the authors of the alternate
reading worry that its emphasis on the need to satisfy the demands of original jurisdiction in 1367(a) would jeopardize the assertion of pendentjurisdiction in cases such as
Gibbs. Id at 355-56. But reading section 1367(a) to require satisfaction of the demands of original jurisdiction (i.e., including the diversity rules) poses no threat to
Gibbs once one recalls that the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction governs jurisdiction
over related state-law claims joined with federal-question claims at the initial pleading
stage. By preserving a conceptual distinction between pendent and ancillary jurisdiction and by recalling that pendent jurisdiction was (and may remain) simply unavailable in diversity, the sympathetic account avoids the pitfalls that Professors Tidmarsh
and Transgrud identify.
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doctrine of pendent jurisdiction as the measure of such joinder and
section 1367 seemingly preserves that choice in language preserving
the rules of originaljurisdiction.
Recent decisions, which explicitly reject the approach of Abbott
Laboratories and Stromberg, provide some basis for optimism. In Leonhardt v. Western Sugar Co., the Tenth Circuit rejected the textualism of
the two prior circuit decisions and concluded that Zahn remains good
law.' 4 1 Citing an early draft of this Article, the court found that the
text of section 1367 can be read "literally, and unambiguously" to incorporate the established rules governing the amount in controversy
requirement for diversityjurisdiction.'4 Some months later, in MeritcareInc. v. St. PaulMercury InsuranceCo., the Third Circuit followed the
Tenth Circuit's lead in rejecting the argument that section 1367 overrules Zahn.'4 Although the Third Circuit found the Tenth's account
of the text attractive, it ultimately based its decision on the legislative
history (as had the Tenth) following the established rule that courts
may defer to the legislative history in the face of ambiguities in the
relevant text. 44 Writing for the court, Judge Joseph Weis-the judge
who had chaired the Federal Courts Study Committee and had represented the Judicial Conference in testimony about the statute in
1990-made a compelling case that the history pointed to the preservation of the complete diversity rules.
2. Preserving St. Paul
The sympathetic reading also helps to expose the flaws in the
Fourth Circuit's decision in Shanaghan v. Cahill, which read section
1367 as replacing the bright-line rule of St. Paulwith the discretionary
regime of section 1367(c).45 Shanaghanproceeded by assuming that

4

160 F.3d 631, 640 (10th Cir. 1998) (concluding that "a literally and textually

faithful reading of section 1367(a) leads to the opposite conclusion from that of [Abbott Laboratoriesand Stromberg]").
l4
Rd at 639 n.6, 640.
4

166 F.3d 214, 222 (3d Cir. 1999) (holding that section 1367 "preserves the pro-

hibition against aggregation... and thus maintains the traditional rules governing diversity").
14 See id. at 222 (finding "sufficient ambiguity in [section 1367] to
make resort to
the legislative history appropriate").
145 58 F.3d 106, 112 (4th Cir. 1995) (holding that under section 1367 courts should
"weigh convenience and fairness to both parties, as well as the interests of judicial
economy" in deciding whether to retain jurisdiction over claims that fall below the
amount-in-controversy requirements post-filing).
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the assertion of jurisdiction over claims aggregated to meet the jurisdictional threshold represented an assertion of supplemental jurisdiction under section 1367(a). In truth, however, the federal courts have
long applied their aggregation rules, not as a matter of supplemental
jurisdiction, but as a matter of original jurisdictional analysis.
Since
the district court's power to hear the additional claims in Shanaghan
did not, strictly speaking, derive from the grant of supplemental jurisdiction in section 1367(a), the Fourth Circuit had no basis for bringing the discretionary regime of section 1367(c) into play. 4 7 Subsection (c), after all, permits the district court to refrain from exercising
"supplemental," not original, jurisdiction. One might defend the outcome in Shanaghan as part of a considered review of the messy aggregation rules that govern original jurisdiction, but such a review would
have to confront the controlling language of St. Paulmore directly.
3. Joinder in Alienage Cases
The sympathetic reading also lays to rest the concern that section
1367 might have unwittingly foreclosed the assertion of pendent-party
jurisdiction in alienage cases.
The sympathetic reading teaches that
146 See supra text

accompanying notes 80-92 (discussing the distinction between ag-

gregation rules and supplemental jurisdiction).
147For a well-reasoned rejection of Shanaghan that emphasizes the distinction between rules of original and supplemental jurisdiction in diversity matters, see WoldeMeskel v. VocationalInstructionProject Community Services, Inc., 166 F.3d 59, 64-65 (2d Cir.
1999). But see Stevenson v. Severs, 158 F.3d 1332, 1334 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (following
Shanaghan).
148 It was Professor Freer who first argued that section 1367(b) flatly bars the
use of
pendent-partyjurisdiction in alienage matters. See Freer, Life AfterFinley, supranote 3,
at 474-75 ("Although no one objects to pendent parties jurisdiction in [alienage cases],
the statute outlaws its use, probably through inadvertence."). Professor Freer based his
argument on the standard account of the Rule 20-reference in section 1367(b), which
he took to apply to any attempt by plaintiffs to join additional defendants in matters
within the scope of the jurisdiction conferred by section 1332. Seeing the reference to
section 1332 as requiring complete diversity in alienage jurisdiction, as well as citizencitizen diversity, Professor Freer argued that the drafters had inadvertently eviscerated
pendent-party jurisdiction. The drafters responded by arguing that section 1367(b)
did not require such an outcome, pointing to the language at the end of the provision
that forecloses supplemental jurisdiction only where inconsistent with the jurisdictional requirements of section 1332. See Rowe et al., A Reply, supra note 3, at 954-55
(noting that after the passage of section 1367, federal courts remain free to "abolish
the complete diversity rule for alienage jurisdiction"). According to the drafters, the
statute simply refused to address the question of pendent parties in alienage, leaving
the matter for resolution ultimately by the Supreme Court. See id. Compare Arthur &
Freer, The Disaster,supra note 3, at 978-81 (expressing doubt that the statute's text can
be construed to leave the matter to judicial discretion), and Arthur & Freer, Close
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the rules governing original jurisdiction in section 1332 matters remain intact, having been incorporated by reference into section
1367(a). Just as it preserves the rules of complete diversity in suits
brought under section 1332(a) (1), section 1367(a) can be read sympathetically to preserve the role of the federal courts in giving shape
to the rules of diversity in alienage cases under section 1332(a)(2).
The rules of diversity in alienage matters have arisen by virtue of the
federal courts' interpretation of the demands of original jurisdiction;14 1 they do not depend on the grant of supplemental jurisdiction
in section 1367(a) and do not come within the ambit of the restrictive
language in section 1367(b). One can thus conclude that the statute
preserves the status quo, just as its defenders have argued, without
having to rely upon the language in section 1367(b) that relaxes its
otherwise flat prohibition of the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction
in specified situations under section 1332."o
4. SupplementalJurisdiction After Removal
Early comments on the supplemental jurisdiction statute expressed a variety of concerns about its application to removed actions.5 1 Some observers, for example, questioned whether the statute
would apply to removed cases at all, noting that the final version of
Enough, supra note 3, at 1012 (suggesting that courts interpreting the statute will not
reach uniform conclusions regarding its application), with Rowe et al., A Coda, supra
note 3, at 998-99 (restating the claim of statutory agnosticism on the issue of alienage
jurisdiction).
"9 The question ofjurisdiction in alienage cases continues to evolve. See Rowe, supra note 8, at 59-61 (summarizing the rules of complete diversity that have emerged in
section 1332 (a) (2) cases but arguing that the rules make no sense and inappropriately
restrict access to federal courts for aliens who may suffer bias in state courts). Professor Rowe acknowledges that the Supreme Court might yet rewrite these rules but considers the prospect unlikely and on that basis urges statutory reform. See id. at 61. I
have no quibble with the proposed reform and simply note that the current statute
does not codify a complete-diversity rule for alienage matters but leaves the matter for
resolution by the federal courts, and ultimately the Supreme Court, in the interpretation of the grant of originajurisdiction.
'soFor an account of the drafters' argument for the preservation of the status quo,
relying upon the language in section 1367(b), see supranote 148.
," See Freer, Life After Finley, supra note 3, at 485 (questioning whether the statute
applies to removed cases); McLaughlin, supra note 1, at 949-52 (pointing out inequities
to plaintiffs in removed actions if the statute is applied); Karen Nelson Moore, The
SupplementalJurisdictionStatute: An Important but ControversialSupplement to FederalJurisdiction, 41 EMoRY LJ. 31, 58-60 (1992) (discussing the statute's possible effects on removal cases). But seeJoan Steinman, SupplementalJurisdictionin § 1441 Removed Cases:
An Unsurveyed Frontierof Congress' Handiwork, 35 ARIZ. L. REV. 305, 308-10 (1993) (supporting the applicability of the statute).
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the statute dropped the specific reference to removed actions that had
appeared in an early draft 5 2 Others expressed doubts that section
1367(b) applied to actions removed on the basis of diversity; these
doubts stemmed from the perception that removal jurisdiction depends upon the interaction of sections 1332 and 1441 and not "solely"
on section 1332 as section 1367(b) specifies. 53 Still others worried
about the unfairness that might result from the application of Kroger
(and other restrictive rules of complete diversity) to plaintiffs who had
not chosen the federal forum.-" Finally, some observers argued that
the restrictive references to specific federal rules in section 1367(b)
might have no application to litigation governed by state rules of procedure.'
Coupled with the standard account of section 1367(a), the
inapplicability of section 1367(b) limits to removed cases appeared to
have threatened some broadening of federal removal jurisdiction.55
Sympathetic interpretation can overcome these interpretive problems. The removal statute provides for removal by the defendants of
any "civil action" of which the district courts have "original jurisdiction."57 This test of original jurisdiction focuses on the plaintiff's state
court complaint and considers whether its allegations meet the standards for the assertion of federal-question or diversity jurisdiction.s
It thus appears plausible to conclude that many of the same rules that
govern the interplay between original and supplemental jurisdiction
in actions instituted in federal court will also apply to actions removed

152 See,

e.g., Moore, supra note 151, at 59 (noting that the specific reference to re-

moval cases dropped out during the drafting process).
113 SeeFreer, Life Afler Finley, supranote 3, at 485 (arguing
that removaljurisdiction
is not founded solely on section 1332 and hence is not within the provisions of section
1367(b)); Moore, supra note 151, at 58 (same). But see Steinman, supra note 151, at
328 (considering and rejecting the argument for the inapplicability of 1367(b) to removed cases).
114 See Moore, supra note 151, at 58-59 (arguing
that because the plaintiff in a removed case had initially chosen state court, the reasons for limiting supplemental jurisdiction emphasized in Krogerdo not apply).
'S' See Steinman, supra note 151, at 330 (arguing that section 1367 does not apply
to claims against persons made parties under state law prior to removal).
6 See Steinman, supra note 8, at 103 (noting the possibility that section 1367 could
be read to give federal courts jurisdiction over state-law class actions regardless of the
citizenship and amounts in controversy of class members); Steinman, supra note 151,
at 331 (concluding that section 1367(b)'s inapplicability to removed diversity cases
could expand federaljurisdiction over class actions).
28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (1994).
See generallyWRIGHT, supra note 19, at 224 (describing the rules that govern the
determination of original and removal jurisdiction as "equated" and "linked" though
not entirely coincident).
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to federal court. Whether the action begins in federal court or comes
there on removal, the plaintiff's complaint must allege a civil action
over which the district courts have originaljurisdiction. By its terms,
section 1367(a) applies to "any" such civil action and confers jurisdiction over related claims.
The parallel structure of the removal and supplemental jurisdiction statutes dissolves many of the uncertainties that others have identified. First, it appears quite clear, as the Supreme Court recently
held, that the supplemental jurisdiction statute applies to removed actions.'59 Second, the sympathetic reading of sections 1367(a) and (b)
essentially eliminates any concern that supplemental jurisdiction will
unduly expand the scope of diversity jurisdiction in removed cases. If,
as sympathetically construed, section 1367(a) incorporates the demands of complete diversity into its provision for the assertion of
original jurisdiction, then the same rules that govern plaintiff's joinder and aggregation of parties and claims will apply to diversity matters initiated in and removed to district court. Only after the complaint satisfies such rules can the defendants remove and bring the
doctrine of federal supplemental (ancillary) jurisdiction into play. As
a consequence, section 1367(b)'s arguable inapplicability to actions in
state court does not present an inordinate threat of broadened supplemental jurisdiction in removed diversity proceedings. Section
1367(a), as we have seen, preserves the complete diversity rules and
section 1367(b) attempts to prevent ancillary jurisdiction from eroding them. I6 Facing time constraints, most defendants will have removed the action before moving to implead or otherwise add parties
whose joinder would present post-removal questions of ancillary juris6
diction.1 1
" See City of Chicago v. International College of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156, 165
(1997) (declaring that section 1367(a) applies with "equal force" to actions filed in
and removed to federal court and that removed actions must satisfy the demands of
original jurisdiction by definition).
160See supra text accompanying notes 93-108 (discussing section 1367(a));
text accompanying notes 130-39 (discussing section 1367(b)).
"" The procedural rules governing removal require the defendants to file their notice of removal in district court no later than 30 days after they receive the initial pleading, or, if the action is not initially removable, within 30 days of the date on which it
becomes so. See 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) (1994) (defining the period within which a defendant may remove an action to federal court). This requirement of speedy removal
may explain why we have yet to see any cases that test the applicability of Kroger to a
situation in which the plaintiff had already asserted claims against a nondiverse thirdparty before removal was effected. Cf. Steinman, supra note 8, at 104-05 (noting the
absence of decided cases). Professor Steinman rightly notes the theoretical possibility
of such cases. See id.
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III. SYMPATHETIC TEXTUALISM ANDJUDGE-MADE
JURISDICTIONAL LAW
So far, this Article has suggested that a sympathetic textualism can
produce answers to discrete interpretive issues that fit well with the
text of the statute and with the apparent understanding of Congress.
This Part of the Article steps back from the particular issues to argue
that the sympathetic reading of section 1367 also provides a stronger
foundation on which to build a workable body of jurisdictional law.
By reading section 1367 as a general grant of pendent and ancillary
jurisdiction and as a decision otherwise to leave many jurisdictional
issues untouched, the sympathetic account narrows the range of issues
that the federal courts must regard as ones that Congress has definitively resolved. So read, the statute leaves a much broader range of
issues for resolution by the federal courts, inviting them, in effect, to
exercise the kind of pragmatic discretion that had long characterized
judge-made jurisdictional law in the years preceding Finley. By preserving a role for the federal courts in the development of jurisdictional law, the sympathetic reading may avoid the stubborn textualism
of Abbott Laboratoriesand the elaborate detail of the ALl Draft.
Of course, one can argue that Congress should, as a matter of first
principles, play the lead role in the development ofjurisdictional law.
Congress, after all, bears responsibility for the decision to create inferior federal courts and
has162broad, if not unfettered, control over the
.. .
scope of theirjurisdiction.
Many thoughtful observers have emphasized the importance of legislative control of jurisdiction and have
worried that the courts will take too many liberties with their jurisdictional grants. Professor Martin Redish, for example, speaks for many
when he argues that the federal courts have no principled basis on
which to abstain from the exercise of jurisdiction that Congress has
conferred upon them.Iss Similar arguments for legislative primacy
underlie criticisms of other doctrines in which the courts exercise
162

For an account of the Madisonian Compromise and its embodiment in provi-

sions of Article III that authorize but do not require Congress to create lower federal
courts, see BATOR ET AL., supranote 78, at 11. See also Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S.
530, 551 (1962) (describing the "great constitutional compromise" that authorized but
did not obligate Congress to create inferior courts and noting that, once created, such
courts remained "subject to jurisdictional curtailment").
'0 See Martin H. Redish, Abstention, Separation of Powers, and the Limits of theJudicial
Function, 94 YALE L.J. 71, 74 (1984) (arguing that abstention doctrines are inconsistent
with American political theory).
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some discretion in defining what matters to hear.' 64
Among the most persuasive responses to this emphatic argument
for legislative primacy, Professor David Shapiro has advanced a subtle
and, to me, quite persuasive argument that the federal courts-properly
exercise a principled discretion in giving more particular content to
general jurisdictional statutes. 6' As Professor Shapiro notes, experience and tradition teach that the question whether to exercise jurisdiction and decide the merits of a particular dispute may defy general
legislative definition; courts may enjoy functional advantages over the
legislature in the necessary fine tuning. In suggesting the need for a
dialogue between the courts and the legislature, 66 Professor Shapiro
argues for the widely held view that the business of defining the contours of judicial power represents
a shared responsibility of the First
6
and Third Departments. 7
Certainly as a matter of history, much jurisdictional law has grown
out of an unspoken partnership between the legislative and judicial
branches of government. Congress has tended to provide relatively
general jurisdictional grants and the Supreme Court has often played
a fairly active role in shaping what we now think of as jurisdictional
law. In a range of familiar cases, the Court has adopted interpretations ofjurisdictional statutes that redefine the scope of federal power
along lines scarcely visible in the legislative text)6 Many observers de'A CompareALEXANDER M. BIcKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANcH: THE SUPREME
COURTAT THE BAR OF POLITICS 111-98 (1962) (defending the Court's use ofjusticiability doctrines to exercise discretion to avoid the merits of some controversial issues)
with Gerald Gunther, The Subtle Vices of the "PassiveVirtues--A Comment on Pincipleand
Expediency in JudicialReview, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 25 (1964) (criticizing such discretionary avoidance as an unprincipled refusal to exercise jurisdiction that Congress has
conferred on the Court).
'65 See David L. Shapiro,JurisdictionandDiscretion,60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 574 (1985)
(arguing that courts are uniquely qualified on jurisdictional matters and should continue to have "measured authority" to declinejurisdiction).
'6 See id.at 577 (advocating a "productive dialogue").
167 Professor Friedman has seconded Shapiro's call for dialogue
between the courts
and the legislature. See Barry Friedman, Dialogue andJudicialReview, 91 MIcH. L. REV.
577, 580-81, 668-69 (1993) (arguing against rigid separation of powers thinking and in
favor of a dialogic approach to defining the judicial role). The Supreme Court's decision in Quackenbush v. Allstate Insurance Co., 517 U.S. 706, 731 (1996) (holding that
Butford abstention can only be applied when "equitable or otherwise discretionary" relief is sought), reaffirmed the existence of the district court's equitable discretion to
refrain from adjudicating particular disputes.
i' See, e.g., Louisville & Nashville RR. Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 152-54 (1908)
(holding that only those federal questions that appear on the face of the well-pleaded
complaint can support the district court's assertion of arising-under jurisdiction); Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 823 (1824) (holding that

156

UNIVERSITY OFPENNSYLVANIA LAWREV1EW

[Vol. 148:109

scribed the evolution of pendent and ancillary jurisdiction in the preFinley years as simply another illustration of the way in which the Court
adapted jurisdictional law to take account of evolution in our understanding of the proper scope of a civil action.'1
Practical considerations help to explain the role of the federal
courts in making jurisdictional law. For a variety of reasons having to
do with the nature of the political process, Congress simply has not
done an effective job of keeping jurisdictional rules in good repair.1
Partly this congressional neglect reflects the inability of federal judges
to play an institutionally effective role in securing jurisdictional legislation; partly it reflects the absence of well-organized interest group
support; partly it reflects the relatively specialized nature of the subject matter and its inaccessibility to those without special competence
in the subjects of civil procedure and federal courts.'7 ' For all these
reasons, Congress has been content, absent a crisis, to leave the elaboration ofjurisdictional rules to the courts and similar specialists.
Even those who agree that the courts play an appropriate, and not
just an inevitable, role in the development ofjurisdictional rules may
Article III empowers Congress to assign federal trial jurisdiction over any claim in
which a federal ingredient appears); Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267, 267
(1806) (holding, despite the absence of any clear constitutional or statutory requirement to that effect, that minimal diversity would not support federal trial jurisdiction).
,69
See Freer,supra note 2, at 55-60 (arguing that one can best rationalize thejudgemade doctrines of pendent and ancillary jurisdiction as an interpretation of the statutory grant of original jurisdiction over "civil actions").
'70For a summary of Congress's work on the judicial code of the United States, see
WRIGHT, supra note 19, at 21-23 (describing the codifications of 1911 and 1948; noting
the absence of any systematic updating of jurisdictional provisions; questioning the
skill of the initial drafting and the quality of subsequent amendments; and opining
that the time has come for the preparation of a new judicial code). In keeping with
these concerns, Professor Wright supports, in his capacity as president of the AI, the
ALI's currentjudicial code revision project.
Although it has left jurisdictional rules in disrepair, Congress has taken an increased interest in the rule-making process in recent years. See Charles Gardner Geyh,
Paradise Lost, ParadigmFound: Redefining the Judiciary's Imperiled Role in Congress, 71
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1165, 1169, 1187-91 (1996) (describing the period from 1973 to the
present as one of heightened interaction between the judiciary and a Congress that is
more willing to suspend and modify proposed procedural rules and expressing some
optimism about the prospects for more effective interactions in the future).
17 For a general account of the difficulties that arise from interactions between
Congress and the judiciary in the course of the extrajudicial making ofjurisdictional
and procedural law, see Geyh, supranote 170. Professor Geyh persuasively argues that,
despite some questions of self-interest, federal judges participate effectively in the
lawmaking process because they are "extraordinary lawyers" who may understand the
law and the implications of proposed reforms better than their legislative counterparts.
Id.at 1219 (noting judges' unique expertise in matters such as procedure and judicial
administration).
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view Finley as signaling the beginning of a new era.'7 With its emphasis on the necessity for written authority, the Finley Court made what
some have seen as a decisive break with the past. On this account, Finley brought to a close the free-wheeling jurisdictional days of Gibbs and
inaugurated an era of close attention to statutory text. If the Finley
Court foreswore the exercise of what the ALI Draft perceptively describes as pragmatic discretion in fashioning jurisdictional rules,'"
then decisions such as that in Abbott Laboratoriesarguably proceed with
appropriate deference to the command of their judicial superior in
hewing closely to the textualist line.
The argument makes sense as far as it goes but the Finley decision
proceeds upon the assumption that the ultimate responsibility for the
content of jurisdictional law rests with Congress, not the Supreme
Court.'7

4

In a world of avowed legislative supremacy, a decision by

Congress to reestablish the partnership with the federal courts by
delegating some responsibility for jurisdictional law to the federal
courts would seemingly answer any doubts about the legitimacy of the
judicial role. No constitutional principle forbids Congress from making such a delegation and it thus seems apparent that a post-Finley
delegation of law-making authority from Congress to the federal
courts175would trump the new emphasis on literal textualism in Finley
itself.
For the argument that Fnley and section 1367 signal a new era of literal textualism in the law of supplementaljurisdiction, see Arthur & Freer, The Disaster,supranote
3, at 979 (arguing that the courts may not ignore the literal commands of a statute
clear on its face); Freer, supranote 8, at 7 (arguing that the statutory model adopted in
section 1367 "locks" future efforts into the same statutory model and precludes reliance on a regime ofjudicial discretion); and Purdue, supra note 16, at 74-75 (opposing
development of the law through lower court decisions and arguing instead that the
statute should provide clear and concrete answers, as in the model of Treasury Regulations). Cf.Rowe, supranote 8, at 54-58 (expressing general support for an interpretive
approach that preserves a measure of judicial discretion and maintains a practical,
working relationship between the federal courts and Congress but nonetheless concluding that certain features of the existing statute require a fix).
17 For the ALI Draft's view of the demise of pragmatic discretion in judicial interpretation of jurisdictional grants, see supra notes 69-74 and accompanying text (describing the All Draft's approach to the statute).
14 See Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545, 547-48 (1989) (arguing
from implicit
separation of powers grounds that the federal courts may not exercise jurisdiction
without an appropriately clear grant of legislative authority).
175 Consider, for example, Justice Frankfurter's famed dissent in Textile
Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 460 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). Although
Frankfurter argued against the constitutionality of a provision of the Taft-Hartley Act
that enabled federal courts to adjudicate suits for violation of collective bargaining
agreements, he did so based upon his contention that the statute merely conferred
17
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Precisely such a delegation can be said to flow from the relatively
open-ended grant of supplemental jurisdiction in section 1367. Read
sympathetically, the statute supplies the grant of statutory authority
that the Finley Court had identified as missing and otherwise attempts
to reestablish the role of the federal courts in working out the details
of supplementaljurisdiction. Three provisions in particular appear to
restore a measure of judicial discretion. First, section 1367(a) incorporates the rules of original jurisdiction in diversity, rules that had
previously developed through the exercise of some judicial discretion
and remained in flux to some degree. Second, section 1367(b) establishes that the district courts may exercise ancillary jurisdiction in diversity matters only where they find it to be consistent with the jurisdictional principles of section 1332.
This test of consistency
incorporates the pragmatic analysis of the Kroger decision, where the
Supreme Court balanced the threat to the complete diversity requirement against the arguments for litigant fairness in determining
whether to hear the claim.175 Third, section 1367(c) incorporates the
rules governing the discretionary decline ofjurisdiction that the Gibbs
Court had earlier specified.1 7 The statute thus provides a framework
within which the federal courts may continue to work out sensible jurisdictional rules.
The question of alienage jurisdiction provides an excellent illustration of the statute's operation as a jurisdictional framework. 78 Ac-

jurisdiction on the federal courts to apply state-law rules of decision. See id. at 460-62
(arguing that the provision merely granted litigants access to a federal forum and did
not authorize the development of substantive federal law in this area of labor disputes). The majority, however, had interpreted the statute as a substantive delegation
of lawmaking power to the federal courts and had concluded that federal rules of decision would control. See id. at 451 (opinion of Douglas,J.) (finding that § 301(a) of the
Taft-Hartley Act "authorizes federal courts to fashion a body of federal law for the enforcement of these collective bargaining agreements"). While Frankfurter challenged
the wisdom of accepting such a delegation without more guidance from Congress, id.
at 463-65 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) he did not question Congress's constitutional
power to effect such a delegation.
'76 For an overview of the Krogerlitigation and the Court's decision to reject ancillary jurisdiction over the claims of the plaintiff against an impleaded third-party defendant, see supranotes 27-34 and accompanying text.
'7 See supra note 47 (quoting the Supreme Court's recent description of the function of section 1367(c)). CompareExecutive Software N. Am., Inc. v. United States Dist.
Court, 24 F.3d 1545, 1551-52 (9th Cir. 1994) (characterizing the exceptional circumstances test in section 1367(c) as narrower than its counterpart in Gibbs) with Brazinski
v. Amoco Petroleum Additives, Inc., 6 F.3d 1176, 1182 (7th Cir. 1993) (describing the
statute as codifying and not altering the judge-made principle of pendentjurisdiction).
'7 For a summary of the alienage question, see supra notes 148-50 and accompanying text.
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cording to most observers, the federal courts had yet to decide
whether to allow pendent-party jurisdiction in alienage cases when
section 1367 became law." It takes a great leap of interpretive faith to
conclude that Congress addressed that question one way or another in
section 1367. It makes far more sense to conclude that Congress simply left the matter in the hands of the courts through its provision in
section 1367(a) for the assertion of ancillary jurisdiction only after the
demands of original jurisdiction had been satisfied. The statute does
not specify the contours of that original jurisdiction and thus leaves
the process of determining the proper boundaries between original
and ancillary jurisdiction to the federal courts."O
Whatever one's view of the merits of that question, I believe that
the preservation of a judicial role provides a better prescription for
the long-term health ofjurisdictional law than the rigorous textualism
of Abbott Laboratories. Recall that in Abbott Laboratories,the Fifth Circuit

not only refused to give effect to the legislative history but also quite
deliberately refused to consider the "wisdom" of its conclusion that
section 1367 had effectively, if unwittingly, overruled Zahn)8

In the

end, the Abbott Laboratoriescourt refused to take any responsibility for
the jurisdictional rule that it applied; it simply declared the legislative
text clear on its face and walked away. Perhaps the court meant to
teach Congress a lesson, as Judge Pollak suggested in characterizing
the opinion as an example of interpretive "gotcha." '82 In any case, the
'79 See supranote 149 (noting the continued evolution ofalienagejurisdiction).
,80 Some may wonder if the district courts would enjoy the same authority to rethink the rules of complete diversity as part of the process of elaborating the meaning
of original jurisdiction in section 1367(a). In my view, the question turns not on the
meaning of the statutory language but rather on the nature of the district court's obligation to respect the unamended decisional law of the Supreme Court. The Court itself has created the rules that govern diversity of citizenship and amount-in-controversy
and those decisions bind lower courts. In the alienage context, by contrast, the Court
has yet to speak and the process of lower court development may continue. Of course,
the lower courts may have reached a consensus that will reduce the likelihood of any
further review by the Court. SeeRowe, supranote 8, at 59, 61 (noting consensus among
lower courts on the alienage jurisdiction question and viewing Supreme Court involvement as unlikely).
181See supra notes 50-55 and accompanying text (discussing the decision in Abbott
Laboratories).
182 According to Judge Pollak, writing in Russ v. State FarmMutualAutomobile Insurance Co., 961 F. Supp. 808 (E.D. Pa. 1997), the issue presented by the supposedly clear
text of section 1367(b) was "almost impenetrable to any audience other than specialists
in civil procedure in the federal courts." Id. at 819. In such a context, Judge Pollak
suspects that most members of Congress would have relied upon the legislative history
as the definitive extrinsic aid to statutory meaning. See id. (noting that the House Judiciary Committee issued a detailed report discussing section 1367). For the federal
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decision certainly proceeds upon the assumption that Congress has
asserted control over the rules of supplemental jurisdiction and must
deal with the consequences of its own mistakes. A similar assumption
underlies the ALI Draft.
I suspect the law of federal jurisdiction will lose much if this rigorous textualism takes hold.
Consider that the doctrine of supplemental jurisdiction-so essential that Congress acted quickly in the
wake of Finley to provide the necessary statutory authority--evolved
through the exercise ofjudicial discretion in the interpretation ofjurisdictional law. One need not applaud each instance of this law to
recognize that the rigorous textualism of Finley and Abbott Laboratories
will ultimately displace the judicial role. The loss from such a pruning
ofjudicial discretion could be considerable, leaving Congress with little guidance on jurisdictional issues and few incentives to approach
them. One certainly has difficulty in seeing what would have moved
Congress to work out the details of pendent-claim jurisdiction had the
Court been unwilling to show the way in Gibbs.
CONCLUSION

I am unwilling to present the story of section 1367 as a morality
play, in which the forces of good interpretation went to war with the
forces of bad interpretation and lost. Reality rarely conforms to such
simplistic assessments, and we have already witnessed some of the unfortunate consequences of rhetorical overkill. Yet it remains true that
a statute Congress designed to achieve rather modest goals may well
result in unsettling and confusing the law of supplemental jurisdiction
to such an extent that it will require further congressional repairs. I

courts, to assert jurisdiction against the weight of such clear history was to say to Congress: "We know what you meant to say but you didn't quite say it. ... [B]etter luck
next time." Id. at 820 (internal quotations omitted). Judge Pollak notes that under
such a "gotcha" approach, Congress and the courts play antagonistic rather than coordinate roles in the government of the United States. See id. (drawing support for his
decision from the need for Congress and the courts to work together as "parts of a single government").
'" A good many observers share this concern. See Cooper, supra note 8, at 153
(supporting a regime of broadened judicial discretion and arguing that the detailed
codification of the ALI cannot answer every question); Lilly, supra note 8, at 189 (suggesting that because "issues of supplemental jurisdiction arise in such varied contexts... their resolution is ill-suited to statutory treatment"); Shapiro, supra note 8, at
218 (questioning the need for detailed codification and continuing to support development through case law).
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have presented an alternative, sympathetic interpretation in the hope
that these results can still be avoided.
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